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ABSTRACT

Loy Wesley Henderson was the Director of the Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs
State from 1945-1948.

(NEA)

in the Department of

A veteran Soviet observer,

he persis~

tently called for the use of economic aid in the Near East to
increase American prestige and prevent Soviet expansion.
Believing that American principles and national interests
should be the basis of foreign policy rather than partisan
politics,

Henderson was a leading influence in the formula-

tion of the Truman Doctrine but disagreed with the Truman
Administration's support of a Jewish state in Palestine.
This work examines Henderson's views on United States
foreign policy,

its formulation,

and goals,

illustrating his

devotion to that which he perceived as moral. ·In analyzing
Henderson's record on the formulation of the Truman Doctrine
and Palestine policy,

it is evident that he remained true to

beliefs deep-rooted in his foreign service background and
brought to the fore by the Cold War.
Primary sources utilized include the Loy W.
Papers.

Henderson

This collection was especially significant because

Henderson disagreed with the accounts of Joseph Jones and
George Kennan concerning the events surrounding the formulation of the Truman Doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION

Former State Department official Louis J.
Preface of his book,
essence of history,

The Cold

~~

as Hist£.E_Y,

in a certain view,

Halle,
wrote,

in the
"The

is the contrast bet-

ween the immensity of its movement and the limitations of the
individuals who,

often with the greatest gallantry,

selves at grips with it."(l)
these gallant individuals.

put them-

Loy Wesley Henderson was one of
For thirty-nine years he faced

the tide of events as a foreign service officer in the Baltic
States, Moscow,

the Near East,

each stop along the way,
resulted in praise,

India,

and Washington.

Henderson left his mark,

criticism,

At

a mark that

and usually a great deal of

controversy.
The most controversial years of Henderson's long career
were 1945-1948 when he served as Director of the Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs

(NEA) .

Events in the post-

war years were developing and changing rapidly with the commencement of the Cold War,

and as the importance of the Near

East became more apparent,

the Director of NEA came to the

fore.

Henderson played a hero's role in the drama that led

to the Truman Doctrine but was cast in the part of villain in
the Palestine tragedy.

Thirty years later,

he wrote,

"More

(1) Louis J. Halle, !he f£!~ ~~ ~~ Hist.£_Ey (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), p. xii.

1

2

criticism has been aimed at me for what I did during my three
years as Director for Near East and Africa than for what I
did during all the other years in the Service."(2)
The criticism came from all quarters and on all issues.
Isolationists accused Henderson and other State Department
officials of leading the United States to the brink of another world war when the President presented the Truman
Doctrine challenge to the nation.

Cold War critics viewed

the Director's anti-Soviet opinions as inflammatory and
unnecessary.
cow,

Indeed,

Henderson was never a favorite in Mos-

as he noted in 1961,

"The Russians consider me as one of

the most dangerous American undercover agents.
the period 1945-8 I opposed them vigorously.
issue,

however,

. During
• " ( 3)

No

aroused more intense criticism than the crea-

tion of the state of Israel.

Henderson's opposition to

United States support of Palestine as a Jewish national home
drew charges of anti-Semitism and disloyalty.

The contro-

versy surrounding his attitude resulted in his "promotion"
out of NEA in the summer of 1948.
Henderson survived the NEA battles and became a highly
decorated civil servant.
guished Service Award,

In 1954,

he received the Distin-

the highest State Department honor,

(2) Loy Henderson to Alfred Lilienthal, March 13, 1977,
Container 11 of 28, Loy W. Henderson Papers, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
(3) ~oy Henderson to William Benton, March 12, 1961,
William Benton File, 1969-73, Container 1, LWH Papers.

3

and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civil
Service in 1958 before retiring from public life in 1960. (4)
From his colleagues Henderson received much praise and admiration.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to him,

"Your devotion to duty,

your moral integrity and your per-

sonal sacrifices have set an example for the entire Foreign
Service."(5)

Henderson was dedicated,

geous in performing his duties.
first and foremost.

energetic,

and coura-

He was a man of principles

He never hesitated to speak his mind and

often paid the price for his forthrightness. (6)

This devo-

tion to principle and to pursuing the interests of the United
States in the postwar world

l~d

ultimately to his fall from

grace with the Truman Administration.
wrote,

"The process of government,

As George Kennan

after all,

is a practical

exercise and not a moral one."(7)
Loy Henderson never believed in sacrificing the moral
for the practical.

This work examines Henderson's views on

United States foreign policy,

(4)
~~gi_~~~

p.

its formulation,

and goals,

United States Department of State, Th~ ~io~Ehi£
!960 (Washington: Government ·Printing Office, 1960),

3.

(5) John Foster Dulles to Loy Henderson,. June 27, 1957,
Secretaries of State File, 1957-69, Container 2, LWH Papers.
(6) William Benton to Graham H.
and William Benton to Loy Henderson,
File, LWH Papers.

Stuart, July 16, 1953,
July 14, 1967, Benton

(7) George F .. Kennan, Realities of American Forei9:!!_
Po!i£Y (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 48.
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illustrating his devotion to that which he perceived as
moral.

In analyzing Henderson's record on the formulation of

the Truman Doctrine and Palestine policy,

it is evident that

he remained true to beliefs deep-rooted in his foreign service backgrnnnd and brought to the fore by the Cold War.
foremost concern was United States interests,

His

not public or

presidential opinion.
The source materials for Henderson's views and policy
contributions are numerous.

Many Cold War authors sought his

opinions through interviews and occasionally the perusal of
his private correspondence. (8)
son,

Others merely mention Hender-

a witness to the tide of events but not a major partici-

pant in them. (9)

This work focuses on Loy Henderson's unique

Bruce R. Kuniholm, Th~ Origins of the Cold War i~ !~~
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980),
Joseph M. Jones, !he Fifteen Weeks (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc., 1955), and Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Pales!ine~ g£~ the U.S. ~ to Recognize Israel
(Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1979) are typical of those who include
Henderson in their narratives.
Kuniholm and Jones rightly
credit Henderson with a major role in the formulation of the
Truman Doctrine, while Wilson recounts Henderson's role in
the formulation of Palestine policy.
Kuniholm had access to
some of Henderson's private papers prior to their transfer to
the Library of Congress in 1981, but he does not cite them as
a primary source.
(8)

~~~~st

(9) John L. Gaddis, !he Qnite£ States and !he Origins of
!he fold ~~E !941-12.il. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1972) and Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, the ~is~ ~en: ~ix
Kriends ~£ th~ World They ~ad~ (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) are typical of those who neglect Henderson's role
in policy formulation.
Gaddis only briefly mentions Henderson's contribution to Cold War policy, while Isaacson and
Thomas are typical of those who neglect Henderson's role in
policy formulation.

5

role in American foreign affairs from 1945 to 1948 as
revealed in public documents and his personal papers.
~ign

Relations of the United States is the primary source of

Henderson's statements on policy issues.
W.

For-

Henderson,

The Papers of Loy

however, provide fresh insight into the man

behind the public figure.

Housed in the Manuscript Division

of the Library of Congress and made available to the public
in 1986, these papers consist of approximately eight thousand
items stored in twenty-eight containers.

They cover the

years 1918 through 1978 with the late 1930s to late 1950s the
dominant period.

Henderson's fifteen hundred page unpub-

lished memoirs are a part of the collection, but he stipulated the draft remain restricted until two years after his
death

(1988)

The memoirs,

however,

tell his story only up

to 1942.
While the papers provide little information on Henderson's personal life, his correspondence discloses his beliefs
and ideals in a manner not conveyed by the words attributed
to him in secondary sources.

Henderson stated numerous times

his dislike of personal interviews and his hesitancy to be
quoted.

He felt the

inte~viewer

meaning of his words. (10)

seldom imparted the true

The Henderson Papers provide for

(10) See Loy Henderson to Mr. Quandt, April 11, 1969,
Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, Container 11, LWH
Papers; Loy w. Henderson Interview, October 15, 1975, IsraelPalestine Coriespondence File, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson
to Sister M. Agatha Aicher, June 6, 1949, Lilienthal File,
LWH Papers.
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the first time the personal written words of Loy Henderson,
words which he carefully chose to express clearly his ideas
and beliefs. While the reader is as free as the interviewer
to interpret the meaning of words,

there is less chance of

misrepresentation of the written source.
Perhaps of greater importance,

the Henderson Papers shed

new light on some important topics.

Loy Henderson disagreed

with the accounts of Joseph Jones and George Kennan concerning the events surrounding the formulation of the Truman
Doctrine, especially the role played by Kennan.
a draft of a portion of Kennan's memoirs,

Upon reading

Henderson composed

a four page letter to his long-time friend recalling in
detail the events of that fateful weekend in February 1947,
which are discussed herein in Chapter III.
written April 2,

1967, Henderson stated,

"

In this letter
the decision

to render aid to Greece and Turkey was made before you were
brought into the consultations."(11)

Marginal notes and

other correspondence indicate that Henderson never mailed
this letter.

He sent to Kennan on April 28 a much abbre-

viated and less emotional version.

Kennan acknowledges in

his memoirs Henderson's differing recollections but views
them as inconsequential.

The Henderson Paperi reveal that

ten years later Henderson disputed Clark Clifford's oral

(11) Loy Henderson to George Kennan, April 2, 1967
(apparently never mailed), Greece File, Container 8, LWH
Papers.
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account of the 1947-1948 Palestine crisis,
in Chapter IV.

In a letter to Dean Rusk,

discussed herein
he privately

answered Clifford's charges and highlighted their inaccuracies;

however,

Henderson made no public denouncement of the

Clifford speech. (12)
The papers also provide unparalleled information on the
career of this influential officer.
this work,
India.

As

detailed later in

Loy Henderson left his mark from.Washington to

As a tribute to Henderson,

torium bears his name.

the State Department audi-

So profound was his influence on the

foreign service that William Benton,
tary of State for Public Affairs,

former Assistant Secre-

suggested this obituary,

"Here lies the man most respected by his peers and regarded
as the Dean of the Foreign Service for his distinguished
attainments and contributions."(13)

(12) See George F. Kennan, MemoirsL 1925-1950 (Boston:
Little, Brown & Company, 1967), p. 314; and Loy Henderson to
Dean Rusk, November 20, 1977, Lilienthal File, LWH Papers.
(13) William Benton to Loy Henderson,
Benton File, LWH Papers.

February 17,

1971,

CHAPTER I

EARLY CAREER:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS

When Loy Henderson came to the Office of Near Eastern
and African Affairs in April 1945,

he possessed a wealth of

experience earned in over twenty-five years of service to his
country.

Born in Rogers,

Arkansas on June 28,

1892,

he was a

student at Northwestern University when World War I broke
out.

Upon receiving his A.B. degree in 1915, Henderson

attended the University of Denver Law School for one year
before entering graduate school at New York University.
the United States entered the war,

Henderson appliJf for but

was denied ·entrance to the First Officers'
because of a stiff arm,

When

Training Camp

the result of a childhood break.

Desiring to serve his country in some way,

Henderson joined

the American Red Cross and was stationed in France in
1918. (1)
In February of 1919,

as a commissioned officer in the

then militarized Red Cross in Europe,

Henderson went to

Berlin as a member of the Inter-Allied Commission to Germany.
His duties were to inspect prisoner of war camps and facili-

(1) See ~i£~E£ic ~~~is~, p. 3; Biographic Notes,
Container 1, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson to David Chalfan,
December 26, 1974, American Red Cross File, 1919-1975, Container 5, LWH Papers.
8

9

tate the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war.

He moved

even closer to the Russian situation in the fall of 1919 when
he went to Riga as a member of the American Red Cross Commission to Western Russia and the Baltic States.

Besides the

hardships which resulted from the continued fighting,

the Red

Cross encountered a raging typhus epidemic in Estonia.
ing these months,

however,

Henderson developed a love and

deep respect for the Baltic people.
brief,

Dur-

His stay in Riga was

and in April of 1920 he returned to Berlin where he

served until August 1921 as head of the Office of the American Red Cross. (2)
Loy Henderson's first foreign service post was in Dublin.

His first Washington assignment came in 1925 in the

Division of East European Affairs, but by 1927 he was back in
Riga as the Third Secretary of the Legation to the Baltic
States,

assigned to the Russian Division.

Since the United

States did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR,

the

Russian Division observed Soviet activities from its vantage
point in the Baltics.

The situation gave Henderson an oppor-

tunity to make a marked impression on his superiors
serving in this area.
L.

Stimson,

interim,

~bile

In reports to Secretary of State Henry

Louis Sussdorff,

Jr.,

Charge d'Affaires,

noted the junior officer's energy,

strength,

ad
and

(2) See Bio~~E!:!i:.£ ~~£~~, p. 3; Biographic Notes, LWH
Papers; and Interview with Loy Henderson, March 1975, for The
GO£~ ~~i£h£££, American Red Cross File, 1919-1975, LWH
Papers.
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ability to inspire his co-workers.

In addition Henderson

displayed enormous executive skills as well as the ability to
study and analyze the complex Soviet situation. (3)

Sussdorff

concluded one memorandum to the State Department:
I desire to state that both Mr. Macgowan [in
charge of the Russian Division] and I feel that in
our fifteen years experience in the foreign service
we have never been associated with any junior off icer who has possessed greater ability and energy as
a political and economic reporter than Mr. Henderson. (4)
Henderson learned a great deal about the Soviet Union
during his three years in Riga;

therefore,

he was selected to

participate in the first diplomatic mission to the Soviet
Union in 1934 as Second Secretary of the Embassy.

Approxi-

mately forty men went to Moscow with Ambassador William
Bullitt.

Bullitt's post-World War I attempt to bring the

Soviet Union into the Paris Peace Conference had been humiliatinily ignored by the Allies,
with Lenin,

who had sent him to negotiate

so the Ambassador went to Moscow with a great

deal of hope for the future of Soviet-American relations.
These hopes soon were shattered.
lousness, dishonesty,

The cruelties,

unscrupu-

and degradation of the Soviet govern-

ment left a lasting impression on all members of the American
mission.

These characteristics resulted in Heriderson and

(3) See Biographic Notes, LWH Papers; Kuniholm, Cold ~~
in Near East, pp. 238-40; and Louis Sussdorff, Jr. to Henry
L. Stimson,-March 6, 1930, Baltic States File, Container 6,
LWH Papers.
(4)

Sussdorff to Stimson, March 6,

1930,

LWH Papers.
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other

embassy

officials

take a hard line.

advising

President

Roosevelt to

When the President rejected this policy,

Bullitt resigned in 1936. (5)
Since Bullitt was seldom in Moscow during his final
year as ambassador,

administration of the embassy was left to

the Charge d'Affaires,

ad interim,

Loy Henderson.

Henderson's direction,

the embassy developed into one of the

Under

most respected and informed missions in the Soviet Union.
impressed those around him with his dedication,
sincerity,

and courage.

He

intelligence,

Like others in the embassy,

he was

appalled by the Soviet police state and became convinced that
ultimate Soviet aims were in direct opposition to American
goals and principles.

Both George Kennan and Charles Bohlen,
were with Henderson in

who gained fame as Soviet experts,
Moscow.

They acknowledged the profound influence which Hen-

derson had on their careers and the development of their
ideas. ( 6)
1947,

Kennan expressed these ideas eloquently in 1946-

detailed herein in Chapter II,

Henderson who wrote to

~ecretary

but in 1936 it was

of State Cordell Hull:

I am convinced
. that the establishment of a
Union of World Soviet Socialist Republics is still
the ultimate objective of Soviet foreign policy .
. that this objective is a
. it is my belief .

(5)

Kennan,

Memoirs,

pp.

63,

69-70,

80-81.

(6) See Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 34-35, 61, 63-64, 81, 84;
and Charles E. Bohlen, Witness 1£ ~istory ~ 1929-1969 (New
York: w. w. Norton & Company, 1973), pp. 17-18, 39-41, 121,
125.
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real one at the present time and is not to be
ignored in discussions of Soviet-American relations. (7)
Henderson informed the Secretary in the same message that he
believed the Kremlin used its international organizations to
take advantage of the rebellious and discontented elements of
other nations in order to strengthen the Soviet position in
these countries.

(8)

Henderson's warning appeared to fall on deaf ears in
Washington,

and the embassy staff was dismayed when Roosevelt

appointed Joseph E. Davies to replace Bullitt as ambassador.
They regarded Davies as unqualified for the post and believed
that the appointment was politically motivated.

They were

deeply disappointed that the President seemed to place so
little importance on the mission,
son,

and some,

including Hender-

considered resigning from the foreign service.

Hender-

son decided to remain despite the changes in information
analysis and reporting techniques required by the."newspaper
image" of Mr. Davies . . Choosing to discuss issues with the
press rather than his staff, Mr. Davies attempted to make
Soviet-American relations appear cordial and to obscure the
differences.

In addition to the anxiety owing to these

policy changes,

Henderson became increasingly concerned with

(7) Loy Henderson to Cordell Hull, November 16, 1936,
United States Department of State, K.£.E.~i~ Relations of the
~~ite£ ~!~tes: The Soviet UnionL !111.-191.2. (Washington,
1952), pp. 310-11.
(8)

Ibid.,

p.

313.
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Washington's neglect of the embassy.
diplomatic grievance,

Repeating a common

Henderson complained about the reduc-

tion of the budget and staff and the insufficient pay of
those who remained. (9)
Despite their differences,
oped a cordial relationship.

Henderson and Davies devel-

The same, however,

of Henderson's relationship with the Soviets.
Philip J. Baram,

was not true

According to

Henderson stated that Soviet Commissar for

Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov informed Eleanor Roosevelt
that the American charge d'affaires was an obstacle to
Soviet-America~

friendship and urged his removal.

unwelcome in the Soviet Union,

Thus,

Henderson left this dis-

tressful situation in March 1938,

and shortly thereafter

became assistant chief in the Office of European Affairs.
His return to Washington did not lessen his concern about the
USSR,

as his main areas of responsibility was the Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe.

In a 1939 memorandum he again

commented ori what he termed the Soviet "spirit of aggressiveness."

As the United States became involved in World War II,

Henderson urged the government to look at Soviet-American
relations realistically. He pointed out that the Soviets were
challenging the independence of Finland,
and Poland.

the Baltic States,

Henderson did not understand how the Roosevelt

(9) See Kennan, Memoir~, pp. 82-83; and Loy Henderson to
George S. Messersmith, February 5, 1938, George S. Messersmith File, Container 1, LWH Papers.
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Administration could be so blind and compliant with Soviet
aggression. (10)

Prompted by the attempt of Soviet troops in

the Baltic States to install puppet governments,

he asked,

"Is the Government of the United States to apply certain
standards of judgment and conduct to aggression by Germany
and Japan which it will not apply to aggression by the Soviet
Union?

."(11)

In the same memorandum,

he suggested that

United States refusal to acknowledge these Soviet conquests
might prove useful when negotiating a settlement for the
postwar world.

According to Henderson, American communists

and liberals viewed his advice "to adopt a firm stand" as an
attempt to sabotage presidential policy.

Because his views

were in disagreement with the administration,

Henderson

requested transfer from the Soviet field in 1943. (12)
Charles Bohlen would later write,
Henderson,

"With the departure of

the Soviet field lost one of its founders,

(10) See Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of
Cold War and the Nati£nal Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), pp. 33-34; Loy Henderson to James
C. Dunn and John D. Hickerson,. July 22, 1939, FRUSL. Soviet
Unio.!!L. 1933-1939, p. 773; Philip J. Baram, Th~ De£artment £!
~~~te in the Middle Ea~ 1919-1945 (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), p. 77; Kennan, Memoirs, pp.
132-33; and Memorandum by Loy Henderson, July 15, 1940,
Baltic States File, LWH Papers.
~h~

(11)

Henderson Memorandum,

July 15,

1940,

LWH Papers.

(12) See Henderson Memorandum, July 15, 1940, LWH
Papers; Loy Henderson to Blake Ehrlich, March 31, 1948,
Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; and Bohlen,
~itn~ to History, p. 125.
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a man who probably did as much for the Foreign Service as any
officer,

living or dead."(13)

Removed from the area he knew best,

Loy Henderson pro-

ceeded to learn about another part of the world.

He accepted

the ranking post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentary to Iraq in July 1943.

Although the first state of

the mandated territory to receive independence in 1930,

Iraq

was still very much under the influence of Great Britain.
Henderson was quite conscious of British interests in the
Persian Gulf and of the concern which British officials felt
about the growing American influence.
line,

He walked a tight

strengthening American ties through oil concessions

while not alarming the British.
were more than political,

His interests in the area

however.

During his term in Iraq,

Henderson tried to learn as much as possible about the cultures and religions of this unique group of people.

He was

especially interested in the Shias and their beliefs.

In the

spring of 1944, Henderson toured the Shia holy cities in an
attempt to better understand the Sunni-Shia schism. (14)
His knowledge of the Near East and its people proved to
be useful in his next assignment.

On April 17,

1945,

less

than a week after President Roosevelt's death, ·Henderson

(14) See Don Peretz,~ !:!iddl~ ~ast To~, 3d ed. (New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978), pp. 408, 417; and Loy
Henderson to corde~l Hull, March 1944 and May 1944, Iraq
Miscellany File, Container 10, LWH Papers.
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became the new Director of the Off ice of Near Eastern and
African Affairs.
Division of NEA,
Murray,

Gordon Merriam,

Chief of the Near Eastern

was the logical choice to succeed Wallace

but his tenure in the foreign service was not as long

nor his personality as "dynamic" as Henderson's.

Murray and

Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew held Henderson in
high esteem and believed he deserved the appointment. (15)
When Henderson returned to the State Department in the
spring of 1945,

the United States was in a state of shock

over the death of President Roosevelt.
twelve years,

For the first time in

someone new stood at the head of the government

at a moment when the nation needed experienced leadership in
world affairs.

Presidents shape foreign policy,

but Harry

Truman possessed little experience in such matters.

The

primary task of the State Department was to provide the new
president with the most accurate and up-to-date information
on the world situation and United States foreign relations. (16)
During most of the next three years Henderson spent in
Washington,

the hierarchy of the Department of· State con-

sisted of the secretary of state,
state,

the under secretary of

the directors of the territorial offices,

the chiefs

of the geographical divisions within each territory,

92.

and the

17
country desk officers.

The under secretary,

especially dur-

ing the term of Secretary of State George Marshall,

was

responsible for the day-to-day operations of the department.
The General was accustomed

to delegating authority as well

as seeking advice fiom subordinates,
brought to the

St~t~

Department.

practices which he

Marshall also encouraged

personnel of. the department to anticipate and plan for future
events.

Henderson acquired this habit early in his career

and easily utilized it in his new post. (17)
The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs was one
of the four territorial offices of the Department of State.
Each office was responsible for a particular part of the
world,

assisting the government in the formulation and coor-

dination of United States policies and actions in the specifie region.

NEA covered an area of thirteen million square

miles and included eighteen Near Eastern countries and all
but two African nations.

The 600 million people ranged from

the world's richest to poorest.
tory,

To handle this vast terri-

NEA was divided into three geographical divisions each

headed by a Division Chief.

Within each division there were

"country desks" where concerns were even more specialized.
It was imperative that the Director of the Off ice,
of Divisions,

and the desk officers understand

the Chiefs

the govern-

(17) See Interview with Loy W. Henderson, October 15,
1975, Israel-Palestine Correspondence, LWH Papers; and Balfour, ~£~ ~£~~£~~ri~~' p. 81.
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ment's foreign policies both in general and as regarded their
special area or country. (18)
This knowledge was necessary to insure the proper handling of all situations from the sublime to the ridiculous,
and some of the routine work did seem ridiculous in comparison with the more pressing issues of the day.

While Hender-

son spent the majority of his time on crises in Iran,
Greece,

Turkey,

and Palestine, he also had to tend to the needs of

the various diplomatic missions of his territory,
staffing problems,

salaries,

and housing.

including

Of particular

concern to Henderson were the rights of Americans living and
traveling abroad,

such as the question of whether American

citizens should be tried under Saudi Arabian laws.

Some

issues were of importance to diplomatic relations but were
not of the crisis variety.

These included such things as the

recommendation to elevate the Consulate in Tunisia to a
Consulate General and the approval of a visit to the United
States by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. (19)
Henderson had well-developed ideas concerning the
nature of American foreign policy and how this policy should
be applied to all aspects of diplomatic relations whether
large or small.

He believed that there were two categories

(18) United States Department of State, Foreig£ Poli=
Their Formulation and Enforcement, by Loy W. Henderson
(Washington: Government ~inting Office, 1946), pp. 8-13.

ci~~~

(19) Miscellaneous Memoranda, Near Eastern Affairs,
1945-48, Substantive File, Container 12, LWH Papers.
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of American policies.
permanent,

Long-term policies were stable and

based on lasting American tradition.

Short-term

policies were extensions of the long-term policies that were
formulated to meet specific world situations.

He felt that

each decision of the State Department should comply with
these policies and the will of the American people.

Conflict

between policy and public opinion should receive the special
attention of the Secretary of State and the President. (20)
Henderson believed that the principles embodied in American tradition,

rather than shortsighted objectives,

be the basis of United States foreign policy.

should

While he

acknowledged the claim of political theorists that blind
devotion to principle led to inflexibility and the inability
to bargain in foreign relations,

Henderson feared the conse-

quences of a policy guided only by opportunism.

He stated:

I urge that
. you bear in mind that if the
United States in pursuit of its objectives regardless how noble these objectives may be jettisons the principles on which it was founded
and on which our democratic and free society is
based, we may well· dissipate our national purpose
and find ourselves helplessly and aimlessly adrift
in a sea of opportunism.
. (21)
Henderson was well aware of the difficulties of pursuing such
an idealistic policy in the real world,

(20)

Henderson,

but he believed that

Foreign Policies, pp.

2-5.

(21) Loy w. Henderson, "The Foreign Service and the
World Struggle," First Carr Memorial Lecture presented at
Wagner College, 3 June 1962, in Foreign Service Correspondence File, Container 7, LWH Papers.
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choices based on traditional principles and American interests would result in the best foreign policy decisions.
was important,

therefore,

It

that the United States persevere in

its pursuit of a policy based on principle and not be lulled
into destructive compromises due to the weariness brought on
Such compromises usually resulted in

by hard negotiations.

only "an illusory relaxation of tensions."(22)
Henderson realized that it was the President who determined United States foreign policy,
relation objectives,

based on his foreign

the advice of counselors and officials,

and subject to Congressional approval and public opinion.
Henderson believed,

however,

that the State Department played

a very important and definite role in the formulation of this
foreign policy.

It was the duty of each territorial off ice

to gather and analyze information from the diplomatic mis-

sions and other sources.

The Director would then convey his

staff's opinion to the Secretary of State.

This opinion

should be based on a thqrough professional assessment of the
facts devoid of influence from emotions or political pressures.

Henderson felt that the Secretary and President

should always receive the department's honest opinions,

even

if they were contrary to the beliefs of the administration
and/or the American public.

Foreign Service officers had to

perform their duty regardless of criticism.

(22)

Carr Lecture,

LWH Papers.

The department,
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however,

should implement whatever policy evolved regardless

of its compliance with its recommendations,
ment served the President.

for the depart-

During the Palestine affair,

detailed herein in Chapter IV, critics accused Henderson and
NEA of failing to implement properly Truman's Palestine policy.

Henderson vigorously denied these charges of disloy-

alty. (23)
His belief that the gathering of accurate information
was vitally important to the territorial offices brought
Henderson into rare contention with Under Secretary of State
Dean Acheson.

In 1946 Acheson supported the Budget Bureau's

reorganization plan which called for an Office of" Research
and Intelligence.

Under the new organization, this off ice

would gather and analyze all information and issue information to the geographic offices on request.

The primary

responsibility of the geographic offices would be to engage

in "operations."

Henderson and Assistant Secretary for

Administration Donald Russell opposed the reorganization.
Henderson did not believe that information-gathering should
be removed from the geographic offices.

These offices were

uniquely qualified to analyze information since each had
intimate knowledge of the people,

culture,

and conditions in

their countries as well as the diplomatic missions located
there.

In order for personnel in these offices to perform

(23) See Henderson to Ehrlich, March 31,
Papers; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.

1948,

LWH
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their duties,
information,

they needed firsthand rather than distilled
and he believed it was necessary for them to

help determine the type of research to be conducted. (24)
Acheson referred to this opposition as· "civil disobedience in the State Department," but Secretary of State James
F.

Byrnes approved Russell's modified reorganization plan,

which was acceptable to Henderson and the geographic offices.
The Off ice of Research and Intelligence would carry out its
function through new research divisions assigned to each
geographic office.

Henderson later recalled that its primary

function was to coordinate technically the Department's
information-gathering as well as to engage in its own
research.

The new office necessitated the new post of Spe-

cial Assistant to the Secretary for Research and Intelligence.

Acheson,

however,

disliked the reorganization,

and

Henderson believed the Under Secretary took advantage of the
resignation of Byrnes in 1947 to change the Department's
intelligence operation at the expense of the geographic
offices.

(25)

Henderson behaved in his customary manner during this
situation.

He gave his honest opinion regardless of the

(24) See Loy
13, 1954, Foreign
and Dean Acheson,
~!~te DeE_artment
pp. 158-61.

Henderson to J. c. Satterthwaite, September
Service Correspondence File, LWH Papers;
Pre~nt ~ ~ Creation: ~~ !~~~ !~ !h~
(New York: W. w. Norton & Company, 1969),

See Henderson to Satterthwaite,
and Acheson, Pr~!~!!~ Creation, pp.
(25)

September 13,
158-61, 170.

1954;

23

opposition.

According to Henderson, Acheson found his objec-

tions disturbing;

however,

it did not appear to interfere

with their working relationship on other issues.

Acheson

wrote in his memoirs that Henderson was an "entirely loyal
and competent officer."(26)

As a dedicated State Department

official, Acheson probably understood Henderson's compulsion
to air his honest beliefs.

He depended on Henderson's candor

in the early stages of the Cold War.

(26) See Henderson to Satterthwaite,
and Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.

September 13,
158-161, 170.

1954;

CHAPTER II
THE COLD WAR SETTING
1945-1948
In the November 1,

1954,

issue of !ime,

a brief article

appeared in the "Foreign Relations" section announcing the
presentation of the Distinguished Service Award to Loy Henderson.

The title of the article was "Honor for a Cold

Warrior."
States,

At the height of Cold War rhetoric in the United

Time portrayed Henderson as a paragon of free world

virtues,

a fighter for the cause.

But what was the cause?

What was the Cold War and how did it start?(l)
The label "Cold War" was coined in 1947 by columnist
Walter Lippmann to describe the faltering relations between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
unique,

but the situation was not.

The title was

Powerful states. have

always had difficulty living and working together.
ences in ideology,

culture,

language,

Differ-

and political goals

have invariably led to rivalry and conflict with each side
blaming the other.

The most obvious difference between the

Cold War and history's hot wars was the inconsequence of
military encounters, but the other elements of war were
p~esent

(1)
p.

-

arms build-up,

name-calling,

"Honor For a Cold Warrior,"

2 0.
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public fear and patri-

!i.!!!~·

November 1,

1954,
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otism.

The war,

however,

heard around the world.

did not begin with a single shot
Instead it evolved gradually from

wartime alliance to postwar hostility. (2)
The early stages of World War II had pointed out the
military weakness of the Allies.
and it did not come cheaply.

They needed Soviet help,

Roosevelt followed hopefully a

policy of fostering Stalin's personal trust.

Henderson cau-

tioned the administration to be wary of Soviet conduct,
there was little sense outside of the State Department

but
~hat

the Soviet Union represented a threat to United States interests and principles. (3)

As John L. Gaddis noted,

curious kind of illogic the Russians'

"Through a

vigorously successful

resistance to Hitler purified them ideologically in the eyes
of Americans."(4)
Jr.,

A former member of NEA,

John H.

Stutesman,

also wrote of American naivete in his 1966 Thesis for

the National War College:
To paraphrase a Russian proverb, To get to the
other side it is alright to walk over the bridge

(2)

See Michael Balfour, The Adversaries: AmericaL
!he Ope£ Worl£ 1941-62 (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1981), pp. 79-80; and Thomas G. Paterson, "Introduction: American Critics of the Cold War and Their Alternatives," in Col£ War Critics: Al!er£ati.Yll !£ Am~rican f.£E.~i££
~£li£Y i£ !~~ Truman Yea~, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 4.
~~ssiaL ~

(3) See George F. Kennan, American Di£10macy 1900-1950
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 77; Kennan,
Realities of American Foreig£ Policy, p. 25; Balfour, Th~
Ad~ers~£ie;~ pp-:-l'0-,-6G~d Henderson Memorandum, July 15,
1940, LWH Papers.
(4)

Gaddis,

Origins of !he

Cold~~£,

p.

33.
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postwar world.

The dream of a new world order embodied in

the United Nations had been the focus of American postwar
plans.

The Soviet Union,

however,

territory and spheres of influence.

sought security through
Unprepared and unsure,

the United States saw another monster threatening the delicate balance and reacted accordingly. (6)
For the second time in less than five years,

circum-

stances forced the United States to acknowledge its vulnerability.

This sense of insecurity was new.

always felt insulated from world problems.
bothered no one,

Americans had
The United States

and no one bothered it. Traditionally Great

Britain had served as the bulwark to any threat .from the
Continent.
power,

The British Empire kept a watch on the balance of

assuring its own safety and that of its friends.

Great Britain's inability to exert a strong influence created
a vacuum in the world power structure that the United States
had to fill in order to prevent what it believed to be the
threat of Soviet expansion. (7)

Ambassador W. Averell Harri-

man wrote from Moscow on September 20,

1944,

"If the policy

(6) See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides£! Crisis: ~Pr!~~
of K£~!g£ Relations (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers,
1975), p. 107; Kennan, American Di.El~y, p, 85.; Balfour,
Ihe Adver~E!es, pp. 12-13; Norman A. Graebner, Cold ~~E
~!£lomacy: American Foreign PolicyL 1945-1960 (Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 21.; Kennan, Realities
of ~~~rican Foreign Policy, pp. 26-27; Halle, ColQ ~~E ~
~!~tory, pp. 8, 102; and Gaddis, Origi~ £! th~ ColQ War, pp.
3, 47-48, 61-62.
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is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate
her immediate neighbours,

penetration of the next immediate

neighbour becomes at a certain time equally logical."(8)
The United States perceived the Soviets as a threat to
the freedom of their neighbors and to American interests in
those areas.

In the months immediately following the war

American policy makers had to define concrete American interests and objectives.

Truman had told Stalin at Potsdam that

America wanted a "free world."
American values,
tern.

This meant a world based on

values not compatible with the Soviet sys-

The principles born of these values,

determination and the Open Door,
areas under Soviet influence,

such as self-

could not be. invoked in

and the United States was not

prepared to militarily challenge the Soviet position.
principles,

These

which Henderson believed should be the basis of

American foreign policy,

blocked compromise and thus became a

hindrance at the postwar bargaining tables. (9)
While the perceived Soviet threat drove most American
officials toward a more active role in world affairs regardless of how ill-defined,

(8)

Balfour,

!h~

the isolationists called for .Ameri-

Adversaries,

p.

11.

(9) See Paul Y. Hammond, Th~ Col£ ~~E Ye~ Am~Eican
FoEeig£ Policy Since 1945 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
Inc., 1969), p. 6; Graebner, Cold ~ar QiEloma£y, p. 9; Terry
H. Anderson, The ~nit~£ ~te~ Great Britain, and th~ Cold
War 1944-1947 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981),
Adverl04-5; Berle, Tide~ of Cri~is; p. 25; Balfour, The ----~ries,
p. 59; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.
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can withdrawal from the world scene.

Still in Congress were

Hamilton Fish

and Louis Ludlow

crat -

(Republican -

Indiana),

New York)

(Demo-

among the leading interwar isolationists,

while the Chicago Tribune and John O'Donnell of the

Ne~

!ork

Daily News attacked American interventionist policy in the
press.

The isolationists believed the "Red Scare" was over-

blown,

being used as an excuse for imperialism.

was the deadly sin to isolationists,
Britain

not the Soviet Union.

nent spokesman,
Michigan,
1945.

Imperialism

and the devil was Great

However,

their most promi-

Republican Senator Arthur H.

Vandenberg of

officially left the isolationist ranks in early

In a speech before the Senate on January 10,

Vanden-

berg expressed his views on America's place in the world.

He

cautioned against the deterioration of national defense but
also called for a United States-Soviet agreement which would
provide the Soviet Union with the security it so desired.
The Senator believed a treaty of this type would eliminate
the Soviet need for a "circle of buffer states" thus placing
the United States in a position to demand that all military
gains be subject to postwar revision under the anticipated
United Nations.

In this way,

he believed the United States

could resolve its differences with the Soviet Union and take
its place in world affairs.

There is no evidence that either

Roosevelt or Truman seriously considered Vandenberg's suggestion,

but this speech placed one of the most influential

30
members of the Senate on the side of internationalism,

a fact

which Truman used to his advantage in 1947. (10)
It is doubtful that the isolationists would have prevailed even with the influence of Senator Vandenberg,

for the

United States was reacting to the new bully on the block.
Even staunch isolationists,
slowly changing their views.

such as Congressman Ludlow,

were

Soviet behavior in Eastern

Europe was not likely to win many friends in the West.

Amer-

icans viewed Stalin's quest for satellite states around the
Soviet Union's borders as a return to the Marxist-Leninist
plan of world conquest.

George Kennan,

Deputy Chief of

Mission in Moscow and later head of the Policy Planning
Staff, believed that Soviet foreign policy had its roots in
communist ideology and history.

The seeds of this belief

were planted in the 1930s while under Loy Henderson's tutelage at the embassy in Moscow. (11)
~ffairs

In his 1947 Foreign

article entitled "The Source of Soviet Conduct" and

signed "X," he wrote:
The political personality of Soviet power as we
know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present
Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had
their political origin, and circumstances of the

(10) See Justus D. Doenecke, No~~£ the ~~if~~ The Ql£
Isolationists i£ ~he fold ~~ Er~ (Lewisberg: Bucknell University Press, 1979), pp. 10, 65; and Arthur H. Vandenberg,
Jr., ed., The Private Paee~ £! ~~£ator y~nd~££~ (Boston:
Houghton Miffli~-C~mpany, 1952), pp. 131, 135-38, 145.
(11) see Gaddis, Origins of the fold Wa£,
Yergin, ~£at~~£ed ~~' p. 26.

p.

134; and
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power which they now have exercised for nearly
three decades in Russia. (12)
According to Kennan,

this ideology preached the hostility of

the rest of the world and the duty to destroy these opposing
political forces wherever they existed.
was the only way.

The communist way

Although capitalism was sowing the seeds

of its own destruction,
quicken the process,

the Soviets believed they could

although there was no need for haste.

Since the outcome was inevitable,
to take their time.

the Communists could afford

Kennan saw this unresolvable conflict

between communism and capitalism as the major obstacle to
Soviet-American relations.

Their distrust of all other

nations made it impossible for the Soviets to deal honestly,
openly,

and in good faith. (13)

Henderson shared Kennan's view that it was impossible to
Henderson's

negotiate in good faith with the Soviet Union.

experience in the Baltic States and the Soviet Union taught
him to be skeptical in dealing with the Soviets.
Soviet agreements,

In studying

he found that the Kremlin usually failed

to keep its promises.

Henderson did not believe that the

Soviet Union had abandoned what he termed "its basic aggressive objectives."(14)

(12) George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct,"
FoE~ig£ Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566.
(13)

Ibid.,

pp.

570-75.

(14) See Kuniholm, fold ~2-.E in NeaE
Yergin, ~~~tt~Eed Pe~£~, p. 26.

~~~,

p.

134; and
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Others,

however,

disagreed with Kennan's assessment.

American columnist Walter Lippmann believed that Stalin was
merely continuing a czarist line rather than a new communist
line.

Like the Russian regimes of old,

the Soviet regime

sought security in a limited European domain,
quest. ( 15)

Louis Halie later wrote,

not world con-

"The behaviour of Russia

under the Communists has been Russian behaviour rather than
Communist behaviour."(16)

According to Halle,

than ambition drove the Russians to expansion.
policies were defensive,
Regardless of the
or practical,

reason~

therefore,

fear rather
Russia's

not aggressive. (17)

for expansion,

whether ideological

the Soviet Union was extending its influence.

The result of either motivation was extremely disturbing to
the United States.
Heated rhetoric on both sides worsened the situation.
In a February 9,

1946 election speech,

credit for the defeat of the Germans,

Stalin took all the
stating that the vie-

tory proved the superiority of the Soviet social system.

The

West viewed this rare radio address as evidence of the Premier's true feelings about Soviet-Western relations.

Ken-

(15) Walter Lippmann, !h~ Col£ Wa£!. ~ ~~£y.in .!!...:..~~
Policy (New York: Harper, 1947), cited in Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., ed., The Dynamics of World Power: ~Doc~
mentary ~ist,£E.y £! gni~ed States ~ign Policy 1945-1971,
vol. 2: Eastern Euro~ and~ Soviet Union, ed. by Walter
LaFeber (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), p.xix.
Fo.E_~ign

(16)

Halle,

Col£ War as History,

(17)

Ibid.,

pp.

12,

17.

p. 11.
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nan's "Long Telegram" from Moscow on February 22 affirmed
this view.
article,

Writing a year and a half before his "Mr. X"

Kennan examined Soviet thought and behavior in an

attempt to forecast future Soviet activity and to guide
American policy. (18)

He wrote that Soviet power was:

Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly
sensitive to logic of force.
For this reason it
can easily withdraw - and usually does - when
strong resistance is encountered at any point. (19)
Wiriston Churchill expressed this sentiment publicly in a
speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri,
~-

on March

In what has become known as the "Iron Curtain Speech,"

the British Prime Minister described the split that existed
in world affairs.

He called for the Western democracies to

put forth a united front based on military strength in order
to insure their security.

The response from Moscow was

heated as Stalin compared Churchill's views to those of
Hitler's on racial superiority.

Still not ready to acknowl-

(18) See Embassy of .the USSR, ~~ech Delivered £y i!..=.. Y..:_
Stalin at Meeting: of Voters of !:_he Stalin Electo.E_al Area of
~os~ (Washington, 1946), reprinted in Schlesinger, ~Y~ics
of Worl£ Po~, 2:191-93; Herbert Feis, Trust to Terror: !~~
££1£ WaE.L 1945-1950 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
1970), p. 75; and George Kennan to James Byrnes, February 22,
1946, United States Department of State, Korei~ ~~lati£ns of
! he !! n i ! e d St at e s L ll-1.i (Wa shin gt on , 1 9 6 9 ) , VI , .6 9 6 - 7 0 9 .

VI,

(19)
707.

Kennan to Byrnes,

February 22,

1946,

KRU~L

ll..1.i1
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edge publicly a get tough policy, the White House disassociated itself from Churchill's views. (20)
By fall the White House Staff added its own voice to the
cry for action against communist expansion.
1946 summary of Soviet-American relations,

In a

S~ptember

Special Counsel to

the President Clark M. Clifford stated that the only way for
the United States to insure its future security was to halt
further Soviet aggression.

He called for a vigorous resis-

tance to Soviet expansion into certain strategic areas.

Not

only should the United States prepare itself militarily,

said

Clifford, but it should give assistance to any democratic
nation threatened by the Soviet Union in the form of economic
aid and political support.

Clifford also felt that it was

'important to win public support for American policies by
educating the people on the aims of Soviet policy. (21)
Supporting Henderson's views on the significance of the
Near East to United States interests, Clifford called for

(20) See Churchill speech in U.S. Congress, Senate, 79th
Cong., 2nd sess.
5 March 1946, Co~~~~sional Record A11451147, reprinted in Schlesinger, Qy~mi£~ of World Power, 2:
210-17; see Stalin's remarks in !h~ ~ew !Ork Time~, 14 March
1946, p. 4, reprinted in Schlesinger, Qy~~~ics £! ~orld
Po~~'
2: 217-221; and Feis, !rust to Terror, p. _78.
(21) Clark Clifford, "American Relations with the Soviet
Union: Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the
President, -September 24, 1946," in Arthur Krock, Memo_!rs:
~i~~ !ear~.£!! the Firing Line (New York: Funk & Wagnalls,
1968), pp. 419, 477-79, 482.
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specific resistance to Soviet expansion in the area.

The

State Department's evaluation of the importance of this part
of the world emphasized the need for a definite American
policy even though it had long been a special British preHenderson and NEA experts believed that the vast oil

serve.

resources of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula as well
as the strategic location of the Northern Tier states
(Greece,

Turkey,

and Iran)

were crucial to American security.

Russian interest in the area dated back centuries,

and the

State Department was concerned about Soviet activities in the
Northern Tier.
the area,
West,

If the Soviet Union established a foothold in

it could not only shut off Near Eastern

oi~

to the

but the Soviets could also control the Eastern Mediter-

ranean and South Asia. (22)
Oil and strategic needs were not the only ties between
the United States and the Near East.
gious bonds were also tight,
Arab-Jewish conflict

heat~d

The cultural and reli-

especially with Palestine.

The

up as Jewish refugees sought

admission to Palestine at the end of the war.

This issue

caused a split between Henderson's office and the Truman
Administration and between the Administration and Great

(22) See Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 21,
1946, United States Department of State, Forei.s!!! Relations of
!~~United St~!~ 11ii {Washington, 1969), VII, 241-42.
Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 46-47; Berle, Tides of Crisis, p.
156; and Ande~s;~ ~~ited ~!~!~~Great ~~i~~ p. 122.
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Britain,

Not only

the mandatory authority in Palestine. (23)

was this a break in the unity which Churchill urged between
America and Britain, but it created the type of unstable
situation in the Arab world on which the Soviet policy of
expansion seemed to thrive.
~

Soviet actions concerning Iran,

Turkey,

and Greece in

1946-1947 indicated to American oflicials that the Soviet
Union was not content with ·its Eastern European buffer.

It

was in response to these issues that the Truman Administration embarked on a policy of standing firm in the face of
Soviet pressure.
Long Telegram,

Kennan had advocated this policy in the

and it was given public airing in his

Affairs article.

Korei~

Secretary of State Byrnes called this pol-

icy "patience with firmness," but it was in Kennan's article
that the strategy was first given the name "containment."(24)
Kennan stated:
Soviet pressure against the free institutions
of the Western world is something that can be
contained by the adroit and vigilant application of
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting
geographical and political points, corresponding to
the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.
. (25)
American foreign policy finally took shape in Kennan's containment concept.

(23)
Anderson,

European recovery programs such as the

See Berle, Tides of frisis, pp. 155, 169-70; and
United States, Grea~ Britain, p. 152.

(24) See Graebner, Col£ War Diploma.£.Y, pp. 22, 39;
Balfour, !he ~dv~~i~~, p. 68; Halle, Cold War ~~ Histo£y,
p. 107; and Gaddis, Origins of the Co!£~~£, p. 284.
(25)

Kennan,

"Sources of Soviet Conduct," p.

576.
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Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were attempts by the
United States not only to bolster sagging economies but to
show that free enterprise and democracy were a better alternative than Soviet communism.

Henderson constantly urged the

use of economic assistance to achieve security goals,

a

policy which enabled the United States to avoid the criticisms which would have come with a direct military
response. ( 2 6)
This policy also had its critics.
Truman Doctrine,

Even before the

the Soviet Union had opposed what it

believed to be American expansion into areas which bordered
it or its satellites.

The Soviets felt threatened by Ameri-

can attempts to exert influence in Iran and Turkey.

Sec re-

tary of Commerce Henry Wallace pointed out that the Soviet
position among her neighbors was similar to the relation
between the United States and Latin America.

It was thus up

to the United States to seek understanding and cooperation
with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary's public criticism of

(26) See Balfour, The Adversaries, p. 82; and William
Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Conblenz, Unite£
~ate~ Forei9:£ Policy 1945-1955 (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1956), p. 116.
See Chapter III herein for
Henderson's views on the use of economic assistance and his
contribution to the Truman Doctrine.
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administration policy in a speech on September 12,
Truman to ask for his resignation. (27)

1946,

Walter Lippmann also

spoke out against confrontation as the only answer.
doubted that true cooperation was possible,
that "an accommodation,

led

Lippmann

but he suggested

a modus vivendi" was preferable. (28)

Loy Henderson rejected both accommodation and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

He stated in 1962:

. we have uniformly discovered that our flexibility and willingness to accommodate have tended
only to st~engthen the prestige and international
position of the Soviet Union and to weaken our
own. (29)
Henderson did not reach this conclusion hastily,
well-informed in Communist ideology and tactics.

as he was
Among his

personal papers is a worn copy of the Theses and Statutes on
the

~~ir£

(Communist)

Henderson saw it,

International adopted in 1920.

As

the Cold War was the struggle between the

free world led by the United States and the Communist aggressor led by the Soviet Union. (30)

Gaddis wrote,

"American

(27) See Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontaii.2.E....!. Postwar reconstruction and th~ Origins .£!. the Cold War
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 190;
Kuniholm, fold ~ar in Near Ea~i, pp. 365-67; and see for
Wallace's speech ~ital ~~£he~.£!. ihe !?.2_y XII (1 October
1946): 738-41, reprinted in Schlesinger, !?_y~ami~ £! ~£El£
fow~,
2:255-260.
(28) Benton J. Bernstein, "Walter Lippmann and the Early
Cold War," in Paterson, fol£ WaE Critic~, p. 30.
(29)

Carr Lecture,

LWH Papers.

(30) See printed material, Communism File, Container 6,
LWH Papers; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.
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leaders did not want a Cold War, but they wanted insecurity
even less."(31)

The struggle for security and American

interests in the Near East dominated Henderson's policy considerations during his tenure as Director of NEA.

(31)

Gaddis,

Orig_!ns of the Cold War,

p.

353.

CHAPTER III

THE HERO:
HENDERSON AND ORIGINS OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

When Loy Henderson took the position of Director of the
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in April 1945,
brought with him twenty-five years of experience,

he

but only

two of these years had been spent in Near Eastern affairs.
Fortun~tely,

the Director was able to rely on an experienced

Knowing he was not an expert on the area,

staff.

he listened

to those on his staff who had the expertise which he lacked.
The Near East was not the focus of world attention in early
1945.

The devastation in Western Europe and the fate of

Germany and Eastern Europe
derson,

however,

domina~ed

the postwar scene.

Hen-

realized the importance of the Near East to

peace and security,

and he was determined to keep the Near

East free of Soviet dominance. (1)
As he did with all diplomatic questions,

Loy Henderson

looked at the situation in the Near East in light of American
interests and the American policy of maintaining world peace.
He tried persistently to persuade the administration that the
.Near East was as important to the United States as Eastern
Europe.

(1)

Henderson pointed to the strategic value of the Near

Kuniholm,

Cold War in Near

40

Eas~,

pp.

240-43.
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East as the highway which linked three continents and to the
natural resources of the area,

most especially oil.

In addi-

tion the Director of NEA noted the weakening of Near EasternWestern European ties as well as growing discontent among
dissatisfied citizens.

These factors along with the ravages

of the war caused great instability in the area and opened
the door for the spread of international communism or more
specifically,

Soviet aggression.

Henderson viewed the situa-

tion in the Near East as a threat to world peace and called
on the United States and the other powers to reach an agreement on the area.

He realized,

however,

that the likelihood

of achieving an understanding was slim due to the conflicting
interests each power had in the region. (2)
The end of World War II brought these conflicting interests sharply into focus.
of influence,
camp.

The world was divided into spheres

and Eastern Europe was solidly in the Soviet

Henderson and NEA were concerned with this division of

the world into opposing sides, but they believed that Soviet
aggression made it inevitable.

It was thus necessary for the

United States to insure its own position.

NEA emphasized the

strategic importance to American security of Greece and

(2) See Loy W. Henderson, "American Political and Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe,"
!~~ ~~E~~~~nt of~~~~~ Bulletin, 23 November 1947, pp. 99699; and Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, James Dunn, and John
Hickerson, undated, FRUSL 11.!.§., VII, 4-6.
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Turkey,

the only two countries which blocked the Soviet

Union's total control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Hen-

derson and Near Eastern experts believed that it was contrary
to United States interests for this strategic and petroleum
laden area to fall under Soviet domination. (3)
In a report prepared by the Coordinating Committee of
the Department of State,

entitled "American Economic Policy

in the Middle East," Henderson and the other committee members called for an active Near Eastern economic policy.

The

extension of credit and removal of trade restrictions along
with technical assistance would aid the United States in
achieving its political objectives in the area.
tives included peace,

security,

stability,

These objec-

and the assurance

of political freedom to choose their own way of life.
Raising the standard of living in these countries would
eliminate economic discontent and reduce the attraction of
the Soviet Union.

It was also important for the United

States to ease Near Eastern fears of Western imperialism.
Gordon Merriam,

Chief of the Near Eastern Div~sion of NEA,

wrote in a draft memorandum to President Truman that it was
imperative for the United States not to make the same mistakes

VII,

as

Great Britain.

American policy should

(3) Henderson to Acheson,
241-42.

October 21,

1946,

emphasize

K~Q~ l~ii'
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the development of the native peoples,

not the economic

interest of the United States. (4)
Henderson agreed that loans for construction and development were the best way to boost American prestige.

The

Director of NEA viewed the extension of credits to deserving
nations as an "important diplomatic weapon."
the financial commitment was

He felt that

justified since the region was

rapidly becoming a major political issue.

Even though Hen-

derson realized that economic aid alone would not be enough
to win the political struggle in the Near East, he believed
it could yield certai? diplomatic gains. (5)
Henderson's battle to gain administration support for a
more active American role in the Northern Tier proved difficult,

as administration officials viewed the area as part of

the British sphere and thus advocated that the United States
stay out of the affairs of these countries.

In addition many

within the government still looked on Germany as the enemy
and the Soviet Union as the ally.

Henderson,

however,

con-

tinued to press for a stronger American presence in the Near
East.

In Merriam's memorandum prepared for the President,

NEA stressed the need to restore Near Eastern stability.

It

(4) See "American Economic Policy in the Middle East,"
May 2, 1945, United States Department of State, Forei~~
~~lati£!!.!!. of!£~ United ~ta!~L .!.2.~ (Washington, 1969),
VIII, 34-38; and Gordon Merriam to Prasident Truman (draft),
August 1945, FRUS, .!.2.i1' VIII, 46-48.
~~USL

(5) Henderson to Acheson,
194i, VII, 8-9.

Dunn,

and Hickerson,

undated,
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stated that British and French failure to raise the people
from poverty and disease provided the Soviets an opportunity
to take advantage of the situation.

It particularly empha-

sized the perils to Western interests of Soviet designs on
Turkey and the continued presence of World War II Soviet
occupation forces in Iran. (6)
In late 1945 Truman agreed that the Near East deserved a
more prominent position in foreign policy considerations.
Accordingly,

policy formulation for the Northern Tier passed

to the capable control of Dean Acheson and Loy Henderson.
These State Department veterans shared the view that since
the region was vital to the United States,

the administration

should stand firm against the Soviet Union.

This view pre-

vailed when the Northern Tier became a main target of Soviet
activity in 1945-1946.

Acheson and Henderson skillfully

guided the formulation of a definite Near Eastern policy. (7)
Iran was the first Northern Tier country to feel the
pressure of Soviet-American antagonism.

Called "a classic

case of competition for spheres of influence," the Iran
crisis of 1945-1946 centered on four questions: the removal
o~

foreign troops from Iran,

oil concessions,

the political

(6) See Kuniholm, Cold~~ in ~~~~as~, pp. 242-44,
397-98; and Merriam to Truman draft, August 1945, fRUS, l1i~'
VIII, 45-46.
(7)

Kuniholm,

Cold War in Near

Ea~~'

pp.

242-44.
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influence of the United States and Great Britain in Tehran,
and Soviet activity in the northern province of Azerbaijan. (8)
The issue of oil concessions caused tension as early as
September 1944.

Realizing that the United States and Great

Britain were nearing agreement with the Iranian government
for oil concessions in the country's southeast,

the Soviet

Union demanded exclusive rights to the oil and mineral deposits in the north.

The Iranian government's alarm at the

Soviet demand moved the parliament to terminate all negotiations for oil concessions to foreign governments. (9)
Their demands thwarted,

the Soviets proceeded to fuel

growing discontent in Azerbaijan and among the Kurds.
USSR supported the Kurd independence movement,

The

and Soviet

troops in northern Iran refused to intervene while restricting Iranian troop movement into the Soviet zone.
losing the north,

Fearful of

Iran expressed concern to the State Depart-

ment, but the United States chose not to interfere,

suggest-

ing that Iran and the Soviet Union negotiate their differences.

Believing that their internal turmoil was due to the

presence of foreign troops,

the Iranians requested the early

withdrawal of Soviet, British,

and American forces.

In June

1945 the United States and Great Britain obligingly agreed to

(8)

Paterson,

(9)

Jones,

Soviet-American Confrontation,

Fifteen Weeks,

pp.

50-53.

pp.

177-78.
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begin partial withdrawal of troops eight months before the
March 2,

1946 date established by the 1942 Tripartite Treaty

of Alliance between Iran,

Great Britain and the Soviet

Union. (10)
The Soviets were not so accommodating,

and Loy Henderson

became increasingly concerned about the Iranian situation.
In an August 1945 memorandum to Secretary of State Byrnes, he
identified the two main problems: the traditional rivalry
between Great Britain and the USSR for supremacy and the
growing instability of Iranian internal affairs.

The prob-

!ems of the Iranian government reached the crisis point in
Azerbaijan.

Strapped in poverty and neglected by Tehran,

the

province's communist-led Tudeh Party called for autonomy and
in September formed the National G-0vernment of Azerbaijan.
With apparent Soviet backing,

the nationalists revolted

against the central government in November 1945.

Soviet

troops prevented the Iranian army from entering the province
to the suppress the rebellion. (11)

United States Ambassador

Wallace Murray reported to the Secretary of State,
no question but that
defense

Russians

measures taken by

are

Iranians

interfering
in

north

"There .is
with

and

all
it

(10) See correspondence between American Embassy in Iran
and the State Department, February through June 1945, tRUSL
!1.12 1 VIII, 362-380.
(11)

See Loy Henderson to James Byrnes, August 23, 1945,
VIII, 398; Feis, Trust to Terror, pp. 63, 66; and
Fifte~~ Weeks, pp. 50-53.

FR~~L !.2_i~,

Jones,
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seems reasonable supposition that they are actually directing
planned military campaign."(12)
Iran formally complained about Soviet actions to the
United Nations in January 1946.

Resolving that both sides

were willing to negotiate a settlement,

the Security Council

suggested that Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam visit Moscow to
negotiate with Stalin and Molotov.
Foreign Office,

the main Soviet aims in Iran were oil conces-

sions in the north,
port rights,
of

Pahla~i,

1921.

According to the Iranian

internal as well as international trans-

and a special position at the Caspian Sea port
which had been controlled by Russia prior to

In addition Stalin told Qavam that Tehran must recog-

nize Azerbaijan's autonomy.

These conditions were unaccept-

able to Iran as it feared these concessions would lead to
loss of sovereignty.

Qavam thus brought the matter before

the Security Council again in late March. (13)
In the meantime,

the March 2 deadline for the withdrawal

of foreign troops from Iran passed.
United States,

Great Britain and the

adhering to the 1942 treaty,

remaining troops.

evacuated their

The Soviet Union refused to comply with the

treaty until they received a satisfactory agreement on oil
concessions.

Reports that Soviet troops were moving south

(12) Ambassador Wallace Murray (Lran)
November 28, 1945, ~RUSL 11.111 VIII, 464.

to James Byrnes,

(13) See Jones, Fifteen ~~~ks, pp. 50-53; Ambassador
Murray to Byrnes, November 26, 1945, FRUSL 1945, VIII, 456;
and Feis, ~~ ~£ TeEE£E• pp. 69-70, 81.
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toward Tehran and Turkey further aggravated the situation.
The Soviets defended their presence on the grounds that the
hostility of the Iranian government threatened Soviet oil
fields

in Baku and that the 1921 treaty gave them the right

to intervene in Iran's internal affairs if conditions warranted.

The United States called these claims absurd since the

1921 treaty only permitted intervention if there was a threat
from a third power. (14)
While the Security Council considered the Iranian complaint,

negotiations continued in Tehran between the Soviet
They announced an accord on April 5,

ambassador and Qavam.

1946 that provided for Soviet troop withdrawal and the formation of a Soviet-Iranian oil company.

The Soviet agreement

that Azerbaijan was an Iranian internal problem further diffused the Russo-Iranian crisis.

Conclusion of the accord

with the Soviets prompted the Iranian government to withdraw
its complaint to the Security Council on April 15. (15)
"However,"

The crisis in Iran appeared to be over.
wrote Dean Acheson,

"in

what they seem."(16)

~he

Near East things 're not always_

By October 1946 the Iranian government

(14) See Jones, Fifteen ~eeks, pp. 48-49; Paterson,
Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 179-80; Ambassador Harriman (Soviet Union) to Dean Acheson, December 23, 1945, K~g~L
lli1, VIII, 510; and Ambassador Murray to James Byrnes,
December 28, 1945, FRUSL 1945, VIII, 517.
(15) See Feis, Trust to Te££Or, p. 85; Jones, Fi!te~~
pp. 48-49; and Paterson, Soviet-American Co~front~=
pp. 179-80.

~~~~~'
~io~,

(16)

Acheson,

~~sent

at

~he

Creati~~'

p.

197.
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became nervous again and sought assistance from the United
States.

The Iranian ambassador informed Loy Henderson that

his government was at a crossroads and felt pressure to
follow the Soviet line despite popular opposition to this
course.

Henderson recommended to Acheson that the United
;,i

States offer Iran economic and political aid to protect her
sovereignty.

In keeping with his earlier proposals,

the

Director of NEA suggested this assistance include development
loans and combat supplies for internal security. (17)
randum prepared on October 18,

A memo-

1946 by Henderson and his

staff for Secretary of State Byrnes stated NEA's view of the
importance of Iran:
In brief, the Iranian question transcends the mere
bilateral relations between Iran and the United
States.
Politically, it involves our policy of
supporting the independence of small countries in
the spirit of the United.Nations.
Strategically,
it involves the defense of our military interests
in the entire Near and Middle Eastern area.
Both the political and strategic aspects of this
problem are an integral part of the broader question of United States relations with the Soviet
Union. (18)
Armed with the assurance of United States economic and
combat aid,

the Iranian army moved against the rebels in

Azerbaijan in November 1946.
desired oil concessions,

(17)

Believing it had obtained the

the Soviet Union had withdrawn its

See Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 8, 1946,
VII, 523-24; and Feis, !rust !£ Ter.E.£.E, p. 86.

FRQ~ 1946,

(18) "Implementation of United States Policy Toward
Iran," prepared by NEA, October 18, 1946, FRUS.L 1946, VII,
535.
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troops.

The rebels were on their own,

and the northern

province once again returned to the rule of Tehran.

The

Iranian government and American Ambassador George Allen
agreed that the swift victory in Azerbaijan resulted from the
recognition of all concerned that Iranian sovereignty enjoyed
United States support. (19)
American influence was apparent again in October 1947
when Ambassador Allen persuaded the Iranian parliament to
reject the oil concession agreement with the Soviet Union,
leaving the Soviets with neither the coveted oil nor the
northern province.

The outcome of events in Iran gave ere-

dence to the belief that a strong American position could
contain Soviet expansion.

Supporters of the theory of con-

tainment and the Truman Doctrine later pointed to the success
in Iran when opponents questioned their views. (20)
Not all factions of the American government supported
the American position in Iran.

Isolationists did not see the

need to confront the Soviet Union over this affair.

They did

not believe that the USSR posed a direct threat to the United
States,

and they distrusted British "aggression" more than

Soviet.

New York Republican Representative Hamilton Fish

asserted that Soviet claims in Iran were as valid as those of
the British.

181;

(19) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation,
and Acheson, Present at ~Creation, p. 198.
(20)

83 .

American protests of Soviet aggression while

Paterson, ~£Vi~-A~£~~ Confrontation,

pp.

p.

182-
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accepting British colonialism brought charges by the

~~!cago

Tribune that the United States was living by a double standard. (21)

The United States had gained confidence in get-tough
measures,

however,

and from 1945 to 1947 the Truman Adminis-

tration followed the advice of Henderson and Acheson and
stood in firm opposition to Soviet aims in Turkey.

While

Iranian sovereignty was needed to insure the continued flow
of Persian Gulf oil,

Turkish sovereignty was of even greater

value to United States security.

Situated between the Bal-

kans and the Middle East and between the Mediterranean ·and
Black Seas,

Turkey's strategic importance was second to none.

This firmly anti-Soviet country provided a barrier to Soviet
expansion and could serve as a base for major military operations if armed conflict occurred.
cal and economic stability,
unrest,
State,

Turkey's apparent politi-

a rarity in this area of growing

further enhanced its importance.
War,

The Departments of

and Navy believed that the loss of Turkey to the

Soviet Union would lead ultimately to Soviet control in
Greece and the Near and Middle East.

(21)

Doenecke,

Not to the Swift,

Such a shift in the

p.

63.
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balance of power toward the USSR was unacceptable. (22)

A

1946 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:
. the faith and political reliance in the major
non-Soviet powers of the Middle Eastern peoples and
nations on the periphery of the "iron curtain" is a
considerable although intangible factor in U.S.
security.
This faith and reliance will be gravely
affected if not dissipated by success of the
Soviets in their present political venture in the
direction of the Turkish Straits. (23)
The Soviets had raised the issue of control of the
Dardanelles even before World War II ended.
treux

C~nvention,

The 1936 Mon-

the most recent Strait's agreement,

which

gave Turkey exclusive control of the Straits in time of war
as well as the right to fortify them,

placed the Soviet Union

in a precarious position during the war.
belligerent,

Turkey,

as a non-

allowed the Germans access to the Straits,

Stalin rightly felt threatened.

and

The United States and Great

Britain agreed that revisions to the Montreux Convention were
justifiable, but Soviet demands were too high.

Not only did

they want the Straits under joint control of the Black Sea
powers

(USSR and Turkey),

but they also sought boundary

changes through the annexation of the former Russian dis-

(22) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp.
182-83; Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, !he Unit~£
g~~~ ~!!.£ Tur~~y and ~ (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1951), pp. 144-45; and Geoffrey Warner, "Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan," International ~!!air~
50:1(1974): 86-87.
(23) Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of War Patterson
and Secretary of Navy Forrestal, August 23, 1946, fRUS, l1ii'
VII, 858.
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tricts of Kars and Ardahan and the establishment of a base in
Turkey.

The Turks,

firmly opposed to Soviet interference,

reacted to the demands by strengthening their army. (24)
On August 24,

the Turkish ambassador expressed to

1945,

Henderson his concern about apparent American disinterest in
the Soviet demands,

but the State Department's proposals of

September 3 for modification of the Montreux Convention did
not ease Turkish fears. (25)

Turkey was concerned with the

build up of Soviet troops in the Balkans, especially in Rumania and Bulgaria,

but the United States believed the action

was merely part of the Soviet war of nerves and advised the
In late October 1945 the United States

Turks to remain calm.

sent its proposals on the modification of the Montreux ConThe Turkish government accepted the pro-

vention to Ankara.
posals in principle,

but it felt the point calling for free

passage of warships of all Black Sea powe~s posed a definite
security threat since it was the only non-Soviet satellite on
the Black Sea.

The Turkish government feared that the Black

Sea would become a

Sovie~

rejected the proposals,

naval base.

The Soviets,

however;

claiming they did not provide ade-

(24) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp.
190-91; Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 179; Ambassador Harriman to
Edward Stettinius, March 21, 1945, fRU~ 1945, VIII, 1220;
Ambassador Steinhardt (Turkey) to Stettinius, March 22 and
31, 1945, fRUS, 1945, VIII, 1224, 1230; and Ambassador Winant
(United Kingdom) to Stettinius, June 14, 1945; FRUSL 1945,
VIII, 1235.
(25) For details of American proposals see Byrnes to
President Truman, September 3, 1945, fRU~ !945, VIII, 124245.
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quate security for the USSR,

and they continued to favor a

bilateral agreement with Turkey. (26)
In the early months of 1946,

Soviet rhetoric and propa-

ganda combined with the situation in Iran to heighten tension
in Ankara.

The rumor of Soviet troop movement from Iran to

Turkey resulted in the United States sending a small force,
headed by the u.s.s. Missouri,

to Istanbul in March.

Ignor-

ing this display of "toughness," the Soviet Union continued
to pressure the .Turkish government.

On August 7,

Acheson learned of additional Soviet demands.

1946 Dean

Although mak-

ing concession to the American call for universal commercial
access to the Straits,

the Soviets advocated a

of the Dardanelles with Turkey.

joint defense

Acheson and the State

Department concluded that such an arrangement would result in
Soviet occupation of Turkey. (27)
this conclusion,

John L. Gaddis wrote of

"The real problem was that American leaders,

by the summer of 1946,
the Russians."(28)

simply were no longer willing to trust

President Truman expressed this distrust

(26) See Ambassador Wilson (Turkey) to Byrnes, October
27 and November 12, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VIII, 1260-61, 1275;
Byrnes to Wilson, October 30, 1945, FR~ 1945, VIII, 1266;
British Embassy to State Department, August 28 arid November
5. 1945, [RUS, .!.2_.12,, VIII, 1241-42, 1273; Winant to Byrnes,
November 16, 1945, FR~ 1945, VIII, 1279-80; memorandum of
conversation between Turkish Ambassador and Henderson, August
24, 1945, FRus, .!.2_.12,, virI, 1240.
(27) See Feis, !rust to Ter_!£E, p. 181; Soviet Charge'
Orekhov to Dean Acheson, August 7, 1946, FRUSL !2!.~.r VII,
829; and Acheson, Present ~~.~Creation, p. 195.
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in his memoirs:
We had learned from the experience of the past two
years that Soviet intervention inevitably meant
Soviet occupation and control.
To allow Russia to
set up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops
into Turkey, ostensibly for the defense of the
straits, would, in the natural course of events,
result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East
falling under Soviet control. (29)
Loy Henderson suggested to Acheson that the United States
government issue a warning to the Soviets and prepare to
support Turkey militarily if the Soviets attacked.
15,

On August

Henderson and Acheson visited the White House where they

made the recommendation to President Truman. (30)
ments of State, War,
Staff,

and Navy,

The depart-

along with the Chiefs of

recommended to the President that the United States

stand firm in its call for international control and Turkish
defense of the Straits.

After Truman's concurrence,

washing-

ton informed Moscow on August 19 . .Once more a stand-firm
policy proved effective. (31)
Loy Henderson and the staff of the Off ice of Near Eastern and African Affairs had the responsibility of forming a
detailed Turkish-American policy.

Even though Turkey was the

strongest, most stable country of the area,

(29)

and

HOE~

Henderson real-

Harry S. Truman, Memoir~, vol. 2; :f~~ .9_f Trial:;
(New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), p. 97.

(30) A draft of the proceedings in the President's
office can be found in the Turkey File, Container 13, LWH
Truman is referred to as "Mr. Smith."
Papers.
(31)

See Feis, Trust to Terror,
pp. 62-63.

~i!~~~£ We~~~'

p.

181;

and Jones,
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ized that Turkey alone was no match for the Soviet Union.
NEA recommended diplomatic,
support for Turkey,

economic,

and military

even calling for the United States to

supply military equipment,
directly,

moral,

either through Great Britain or

if the British were unable to do so. (32)

Greece,

the third country of the Northern Tier, pre- .

sented the United States with a more complex policy problem.
It had been invaded by both the Italians and the Germans
during World War II.

At the conclusion of four merciless

years of occupation,

Greece was in political and economic

ruins.

The withdrawal of the Germans,

an end to the strife.

though,

did not bring

By December 1944 a civil war raged

between the leftwing resistance fighters and the Britishsupported rightwing government.
regions,

the rebels,

tion Front

(EAM),

Retreating to the hill

calling themselves the National Libera-

carried on a guerrilla war with the aid and

protection of the communist regimes of Albania, Yugoslavia,
and Bulgaria. (33)
The antagonism between Greece and these three nations
was not merely the result of the normal capitalist-communist
distrust.

As a result of long-standing disputes· in these

(32) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 21, 1946,
with memorandum prepared by John D. Jernigan, E:..!3:~ .!_1i_§.,
VII, 893-97.

183;

(33) See Paterson, Soviet=~~Eic~
and Feis, !ru~! !£ TerE£E1 p. 175.

f£~frontation,

p.
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recently formed nations,

Greece coveted territory in all,

all coveted territory in Greece.

Greece,

slavia claimed the Macedonian region,

Bulgaria,

and

and Yugo-

while the Epirus region

was the bone of contention between Greece and Albania.

Each

side accused the other of atrocities and border violations.
The United States did not support Greek territorial claims,
feeling that Greece could obtain nothing strategically or
politically

important

these disputes,

however,

in

these

areas.

A

Greek

victory

would probably invite Soviet inter-

vention on behalf of her communist brothers. (34)
Greek internal affairs were in a state of chaos even
without these border disputes.
ering,

The government was f lound-

the British were desperately trying to maintain their

influence,
prising,

and the economy was in ruins.

therefore,

It was not sur-

that the Greek government sought f inan-

cial assistance from the United States.

The United States

could not support the EAM because of its sizeable communist
element,

yet the repressive government was in complete oppo-

sition to American democratic principles.

Henderson believed

that the Greek crisis was a threat to world peace and a
potential threat to United States security.

As the only non-

communist Balkan country, Greece was critical to the United
States position in the area.

Henderson and NEA urged inter-

(34) See "Greek territorial claims and other problems in
relations between Greece and neighboring countries of interest to the United States," September 1944 - December 1945,
FRQ.§..i_ l1i~' VIII, 300-58.
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nal reforms in Greece as a prerequisite to American assistance,

and the Director warned the Greek embassy that govern-

ment moderation was imperative to maintain United States support.(35)
Increased guerrilla activity,

caused by the return of

King George II in the fall of 1946, brought renewed pleas for
United States assistance.

The inefficient Greek government

was unable to decide how to spend a twenty-five million
dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank in January 1946;
therefore,

the State Department was reluctant to discuss

further aid.
aggression,

The belief that Greece was the object of Soviet
however,

persuaded Byrnes and Acheson to listen

to the request of the Greek economic mission.

Once more the

administration pointed to reform as the condition for
increased assistance. (36)
The threats along the border combined with food shortages and rampant inflation to crea~e a perilously u~stable
situation by late 1946.

The United States,

therefore,

an economic mission to Greece in January 1947,
Porter,

to evaluate the state of affairs.

sent

led by Paul A.

The mission

(35) See Greek Ambassador Diamantopoulos to President
Taylor of the Export-Import Bank, August 20, 1945, FR~
1945, VIII, 234; Paterson, Soviet-American Con!E.£.!!~ati££, p.
185; and memo~andum of conversation between Greek Charge
Gouras and Loy Henderson, September 5, 1946, FRUSL 194i, VII,
200.
(36) See Feis, Trust to Terror, p. 177; Ache.son,
at ~he fEeati.£!!, p. 198; and Paterson, Soviet=~~eri=
f££!Eontati.£!!, p. 187.

~EeSe£~
£~£
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reported that Greece immediately needed extensive United
States economic and military assistance and that an American
mission rather than the Greek government should administer
this aid in Greece. (37)
In constant communication with the American Embassy in
Athens,

Loy Henderson realized that the Greek crisis was

becoming more acute even prior to the report of the Porter
mission.

In October 1946 Henderson proposed to Byrnes and

Acheson a United States policy for Greece.

After summarizing

Greece's internal and border problems and the importance of
Greece to the United States,

the Director of NEA urged a

policy of political and economic assistance before civil war
erupted.

He suggested that military aid might be necessary

if the British were unable to continue to provide the equipment necessary for the Greek government to maintain internal
order and territorial integrity. (38)
The State Department feared that an economically
depressed Great Britain w9uld be unable to meet its obligations in Greece.

Greece had been under British protection

since it won its independence in 1829 and for more than a
century stood along with the other Northern Tier countries as
a barrier to Russian designs in the Near and Middle East.
Although American and British interests were similar in the

(37)

Jones, fif!~ Weeks,

pp.

74-76.

(38) Loy Henderson to James Byrnes and Dean Acheson,
October 21, 1946, I~~ 12.i~, VII, 240-44.
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Northern Tier,

the State Department believed the area was a

British responsibility.

Under Henderson's direction,

NEA

followed a policy of working in alliance with the British
against the Soviet Union. (39}
The United States viewed the presence of British troops
in Greece and the British support of the Greek government as
the only elements of stability in the otherwise chaotic Greek
situation.

Great Britain, however,

financial disaster.

was on the brink of

The biting winter of 1947 brought such

severe fuel shortages that the British economy all but ground
to a halt.

This occurred

~t

a time when Great Britain was

already in financial trouble due to heavy expenditures on the
postwar Continent.
3,

The State Department

~earned

on February

1947 that the British government had decided to remove its

troops from Greece.

This was followed on February 20 by

information from the American embassy in London that the
British might also end financial assistance to Greece.

Ache-

son and Henderson uneasily noted these developments. (40)
The Briiish government interpreted American interest in
and aid to Greece to mean that the United States was commit-

See William Reitzel, Th~ Mediterranean·: ~~ ~o le in
Forei~£ Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948), pp. 86-88; Feis, Tru~ to _!er.E..£!> p, 187; Lawrence s. Wittner, Am~£!£~ ~ervent!on in Greece, 1943-1949
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982}, p. 22; Warner,
"Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan," p. 87; and Kuniholm,
Cold War!£~ !ast, p, 301.
( 3 9)

Am~Eica'~

(40) see Truman, ~£ir~, 2:98-99; Jones, Fifteen Weeks,
75; Hammond, Cold ~I~~' p. 20; and Balfour, !h~
~~~~rs~!~~' p. 47.
p.
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ted to protecting Anglo-American interests in the country.
British Foreign Secretary,

Ernest Bevin,

and other officials

assumed that the United States would fulfill Britain's role
when it withdrew . . Although this was a logical assumption,
the United States was not as anxious to assume this responsibility as the British government thought.

The United States

was hesitant to make such a large financial commitment,

yet

to do nothing would mean the loss of Greece and the Northern
Tier to the Soviet sphere of influence. (41}
The possibility that all opposition to Soviet expansion
into the Near East might disappear became a major concern to
Loy Henderson.
principles,

Despite his support of the United Nations

he doubted its ability to maintain world peace.

He would later recall his lack of faith in the "U.N. boys."
Henderson thus felt that the United States must stand against
the aims of the Soviet Union in the Northern Tier.
ruary 20,

On Feb-

1947, Henderson sent a memorandum to Dean Acheson

entitled "Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse," which
Acheson edited and forwarded to the Secretary of State.
this document,

In

the Director of NEA spelled out the problems

in Greece and the importance of Greece to the non-communist
world.

He recommended reorganization of the Greek government

into a national coalition of "loyal Greek parties" and
reforms in the corrupt civil service aided by American and

(41) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation,
186; and Reitzel, Th~ Medii~~~, p. 89.

p.
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British experts.
ges,

To help Greece with these necessary chan-

Henderson proposed that the United States extend econo-

mic and military aid.

Citing the inability of the British

government to provide the necessary funds or military equipment,

he recommended a direct Congressional loan a;.nd prompt

military assistance. (42)

Henderson concluded:

Under present arrangements Greece wili receive
neither adequate economic aid from he United States
nor adequate military aid from Britain.
We recommend reconsideration of our policy and
decision to assist Greece with military equipment. ( 4 3)
As a

result of this memorandum,

the newly appointed Secretary

of State George Marshall instructed Acheson on the morning of
February 21,

1947,

to prepare a bill for Congress to provide

a direct loan to Greece.

In addition,

he instructed the

department to seek executive clearance for the transference
of military equipment to this embattled Balkan nation.
son concurred with Marshall's directives.

Ache-

He was well aware

of the grave economic situation in Greece and the problem of
Communist insurgents;

however,

he believed there was still

time to implement a favorable solution. (44)

(42) See Kuniholm, Col£ ~~E in Near ~ast, p. 292; Acheson, f~nt at th~ Creation, p. 217; and Dean Acheson to
George Marshall, February 21, 1947, FRU~L 1_!1.2, V, 30-31.

v,

(43)
31.
(44)

Acheson to Marshall,

Jones,

Fifteen

~eeks,

February 21,

pp.

4,

131.

1947,

~~g~L

1947,
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Time ran out several hours later when the British Ambassador telephoned the department requesting an immediate
appointment with the Secretary of State.
absence,
to the

In the Secretary's

Dean Acheson dealt with the delicate crisis.

A call

British embassy disclosed that Lord Inverchapel,

the British Ambassador,

had two notes dealing with a British

decision to stop aid to Greece and Turkey which he wished to
Acheson arranged for Loy

present to the Secretary of State.
Henderson and John D. Hickerson,
Office of European Affairs,

Deputy Director of the

to receive copies of the notes.

Since Hickerson had a previous appointment,

Henderson met

alone with H. M. Sichel, First Secretary of the British
embassy,

who presented copies of the two documents. (45)

Despite the Department's awareness of the British economic situation, officials were not prepared for the content of
As Dean Acheson wrote,

the memoranda.
kers."(46)

Although neither was long,

overwhelming.

"They were shoetheir content was

Recounting the financial,

tary crisis in Greece,

political,

and mili-

the first note informed the United

States that British financial support of Greek armed forces
would terminate on March 31 and urged the United States to
decide whether it could assume the financial responsibi-

(45)

Jones,

Fifteen Weeks, pp.

(46)

Acheson,

Present

at~

4-5.

Creation,

p.

217.
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lity. (47)

It went on to state:

Since, however, the United States Government have
indicated the very great importance which they
attach to helping Greece, His Majesty's Government
trust ~hat the United States Government may find it
possible to afford financial assistance to Greece
on a scale sufficient to meet her minimum needs,
both civil and military. (48)
The note on Greece concluded with the hope that the United
States would respond favorably to this posit ion. ( 4 9)
The memorandum on Turkey was even briefer.

Even though

the Turkish situation was not as critical as that in Greece,
the British felt that Turkey would not be able to carry out
needed plans for both economic development and military reorganization without foreign aid.

Since Great Britain was in

no position to provide further financial assistance,
would have to look to the United States.

Turkey

The note suggested

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and
Great Britain consider measures for the improvement of the
Turkish armed forces and means for financing such a program. (50)
Henderson immediately realized the significance of the
notes.

With the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey,

(47) British Embassy to Department of State,
1947, FR~ .!1_!.l, V, 33.

February

21,

(48) British Embassy to Department of State,
1947, FRUSL ];_947, V, 34-35.

February

21,

(49)

Ibid.,

35.

(50)

Ibid.,

35-37.
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it appeared

that Great Britain was reducing its role in

world affairs and was asking the United States to take over
the

job.

No area was of greater importance to Western secu-

rity than Greece and Turkey.
with a dilemma.

Historically,

The United States was now faced
the American government was

reluctant to involve the nation in international commitments,
but the abandonment of Greece meant the vital Near and Middle
East would be lost to the Soviet sphere of influence. (51)
The facts of the British memoranda were not new to the
State Department,

but the United States suddenly confronted a

six weeks deadline to shape a policy.

Henderson immediately

went to see Dean Acheson to discuss the British notes.
son agreed that the United States had to act quickly,

Achebut

only Congress could grant the large level of funds necessary
to provide adequate aid to Greece and Turkey.
situation was clear.
Greece and Turkey,
and Middle East.
one decision,

To NEA the

Either give the needed assistance to

or accept Soviet domination of the Near
For Henderson and Acheson there was only

and the State Department had to execute that

decision immediately.

Acheson asked Henderson to mobilize

his staff in order to prepare a policy statement on the
Greek-Turkish situation for the Secretary of State by Monday.
He also instructed the Director to show him the NEA memoran-

(51) See Jones, Fifteen ~ks, p. 7; and Stephen G.
Xydis, Gr~~ and the Great Powers 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki:
In.stitute for Balk~;--Studies, 1963)~487:"

66
dum upon its completion.

With this charge Loy Henderson took

the lead in preparing a program to aid these nations. (52)
Henderson assembled his best qualified staff,
Henry Villard,

Jack Jernigan,

and William Baxter.

including
Working

under Henderson's direction nearly around the clock from Friday evening through Sunday morning,
position document entitled,

these men prepared a

"Position and Recommendations of

the Department of State Regarding Immediate and Substantial
The paper made clear the depart-

Aid to Greece and Turkey."

ment's conviction that.the United States should accept the
new responsibility and alleviate the crisis in Greece.
derson recommended that the departments of State,

War,

HenNavy,

and Treasury discuss the Greek-Turkish affair and present
their findings to the President.

A consensus of need for aid

would necessitate consultation with Congressional leaders and
drafting of legislation.

The paper also recommended advising

the American people of the grave state of affairs in Greece
and Turkey. (53)

John H.· Stutesman wrote of Henderson's

influence on the memorandum:

(52) See Jones, Fifteen Week~, pp. 7-8, 131; Kuniholm,
Cold ~~E in Near Ea~, pp. 7-8, 10; and Henderson to Kennan
(draft), April 2,. 1967, LWH Papers.
Henderson's account of
the weekend of February 21-23 does not always agree with that
of Jones.
Where discrepancies occur, Henderson's version has
been used.
(53) see Henderson to Kennan (draft), April 2, 1967, LWH
Papers; Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, undated, KRU~L 1.1i2,
v, 52-55; and Stutesman Thesis, LWH Papers.
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Drafting the President's speech proved to be a difficult
assignment.

Loy Henderson,

Gordon Merriam,

and Joseph Jones

drafted preliminary versions of the message.

Although none

became the final message, Acheson now had a valuable guide.
The Under Secretary of State personally presided over a
drafting conference on March 4 but chose Jones to prepare the
final message.

In preparing the speech and legislation,

Jones and Acheson chose to minimize the questions of national
security and military aid,

since the department did not want

to alarm the American people.

Instead the draft emphasized

the economic issues. (56)
When Dean Acheso.n and George Marshall met with President
Truman and Congressional leaders,

the Secretary of State

presented the State Department's draft and explanation.
Sensing they were not impressed,

Acheson proceeded to recount

instances of Soviet aggression in the Near.East and the
threat of Soviet influence spreading to other areas.

The

Under Secretary's remarks persuaded Senator Arthur Vandenberg,

and he agreed to support the program.

Acheson,

Vandenberg stated,

"Mr. President,

that to the Congress and the country,

According to
if you will say

I will support you and

I believe that most of its members will do the same."(57)
Despite his dislike of "crisis diplomacy," the Senator

(56)

Jones, ~i!~ weeks, pp.

(57)

Acheson,

143-44,

Pr~~nt ~~ th~ fEeati.£.!2,

153,
p.

163.

219.
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believed that American self-interest should be coupled with
positive action.

A broader scope also appealed to the Presi-

dent who thought the State Department's draft sounded like an
"investment prospectus."

Mr. Truman and Clark Clifford

edited the speech to place its emphasis on the broad issues
~

of world affairs. (58)
'
'

.'

During the weeks of preparation,

Henderson kept the

Greek government abreast of developments.
informed the Greek Charge d'Affaires,

On February 28,

he

Paul Economou-Gouras,

of the British retrenchment and of the intention of the
United States to offer substantial assistance.

Henderson

helped Economou-Gouras draft a request for aid on behalf of
the Greek government so that the United States could avoid
the appearance of interfering in the internal affairs of a
foreign state.

The extent of the United States investment

meant,

that the American government would interfere

however,

considerably in Greek internal affairs.

Henderson under-

scored the necessity for the complete cooperation of the
Greek government.

On March 10, the Director of NEA expressed

optimism to the Charge d'Affaires that the bill for Greek aid
would receive Congressional approval despite the growing

(58) See Richard M. Freeland, !h~ Tr_!:!!!!an Doctrine ~~
the Qrigins £!McCarthyism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972),
pp. 97-98; and Vandenberg, Private f~E..~.t pp. 340, 347.
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feeling that the United Nations,

rather than a single nation,

should at on this matter. (59)
The situation in Turkey was not quite as clear cut.
Acheson

suggested that Henderson meet with George Kennan,

then serving as Faculty Advisor at the National War College,
in order to obtain his ideas on the situation in Turkey and
Greece.

Kennan supported Greek aid,

but he believed that

assistance to Turkey could possibly lead to armed conflict
with the Soviet Union.

Henderson,

however,

felt that ignor-

ing Turkish needs would be demoralizing enough to the Turks
to move them to give up their anti-Soviet stand.

Even though

Turkey's internal affairs were relatively stable,

department

officials were alarmed over the consequences of possible
Soviet control in Turkey.

The country would be dangerously

weakened by its military expenses if American assistance did
not fill the void of British withdrawal.
shared his concerns with Acheson,

Kennan apparently

but Turkey remained a part

of the program. (60)

(59)

Xydis, Q~ce and the Great Pow~~'

pp.

478-79,

486.
Troubled Allianc.e: ~£Ekish=
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1972), p. 26; and Henderson to Kennan (draft),
April 2, 1967, LWH Papers.
Henderson disagreed with Kennan's
account of the latter's involvement in the preparation of the
Truman Doctrine.
Once more Henderson's version has been
used.
He verified his recollections with Villard, Baxter,
and Acheson.
(60)

see George S. Harris,

~~~EiC~~ Prob!~~ i~ Historic~! ~er~E~ctiv~ l.2.i~-192.!.
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Even though assistance to Turkey remained in the proposed aid program,

it did not include aid for Iran,

country of the Northern Tier.

the third

Henderson had given considera-

tion to including Iran in the NEA proposal,

but he abandoned

the idea since the British had not mentioned that they were
relinquishing their role in Iran.

He was keenly aware of

British possessiveness of the Persian Gulf region from his
service in Iraq.

The State Department decided that there was

no immediate threat to Iran's independence internally or externally,

and that Congress might be reluctant enough to aid

the hard pressed Greeks and Turks.
however,

Iran,

Henderson encouraged

to seek credit through ordinary channels. (61)

Thus with Turkey in and Iran out,
delivered his address to a
12,

1947.

President Harry Truman

joint session of Congress on March

Robert J. Donovan called it "probably the most

enduringly controversial speech that has been made by a
president in the twentieth century."(62)
Yergin,

According to Daniel

it was deliberately written as a 'sales job.'

"

. the All-out speech represented a deliberate effort to
create a public consensus for the private beliefs within the

(61) See Kuniholm, fold War in ~~ ~~~~' p. 409; memorandum of conversation between Loy Henderson and Gholam Aram
(Iranian Embassy), April 14, 1947, FRUS, 1942, V, 905.
(62) Robert J. Donovan, ~!lie~ ~nd Crisis~ !he Presi£~~£Y £! HarEY ~~ Tr~~!!.L. 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company,

1977),

p.

283.
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Administration."(63)

John Gaddis concisely called the speech

"a form of shock therapy."(64)

Truman set the tone in the

first few sentences when he maintained that the situation
involved national security as well as foreign policy.

He

explained the Greek crisis in vivid terms and the urgent need
for a United States response due to the pending British withdrawal.

The President avoided mention of the Greek govern-

ment's problems,

while emphasizing its democratic aims.

His

reference to Turkey was brief, merely stating that Turkey
needed United States assistance in order to maintain its
national integrity.

He set the price of peace and security

at four hundred million dollars.

The remainder of the Presi-

dent's address placed the Greek and Turkish situations into
the perspective of world affairs. (65)

Truman said:

At the present moment in world history nearly every
nation must choose between alternative ways of
life.
. One way of life is based upon the will
of the majority.
The second way of life is
based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed
upon the majority.
I believe that we must
assist free peoples· to work out their own destinies
in their own way. (66)
There were thus two main themes in President Truman's
speech.

One dealt with the foreign economic responsibilities

(63)

Yergin,

Shattered

(64)

Gaddis,

Origin~£!

Pe~,

p.

283.

!he££!£ War,

p.

351.

Public Pa~E~ of !h~ Presidents of ~h~ Unite£
Truman, !2.i.1. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 176-80.
(65)

~!~~es~ ~~y ~~

(66)

Ibid.,

pp.

178-79.
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of the United States,

and the other expressed American con-

cern over the spread of totalitarianism,
communism.

more specifically

This emphasis led many to view the speech as a

commitment to help all free nations resist communism. (67)
Reactions to President Truman's address were numerous
and varied.

Greece,

of course,

had been waiting anxiously

for promised United States assistance,

but Turkey was some-

what surprised by the urgency of the President's comments.
Although it welcomed aid in improving its armed forces,

some

Turkish officials feared it would lead to American intervention in Turkish internal affairs.

There was also concern

about the vagueness of the American commitment to Turkey and
how long the financial aid would last.

Despite some appre-

hension Turkey was pleased with the security that arose from
association with the United States. (68)
European reaction was mixed.
Foreign Office was elated,

In Great Britain the

but the Labour Party government

accused the United States of attempting to establish an
empire.

Most European leaders saw the program as an exten-

sion of American influence,
ings about this occurrence.

but they differed in their feelGenerally,

those seeking an

obstacle to Soviet expansion applauded the President's
speech,

86.;

while communists and socialists expressed their dis-

(67) See Freeland, Truman Doctrine and
and Jones, Fifteen We~, p. 12.

McCart£yis~,

p.
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pleasure.

The reaction from the Soviet Union was particu-

larly virulent,

accusing the United States of expansion, but

Stalin made no move to retaliate.

In Yugoslavia Tito charged

"American imperialism" with threatening war. (69)
Trµman's

speech received both praise and criticism from

American officials.

Loy Henderson lauded the doctrine as an

example of American "determination to preserve freedom and
independence," while George Kennan recalled that he criticized the speech at the time precisely because of this broad
commitment.

Kennan felt that the grandiose language of the

address implied that United States action in response to the
Greek crisis would be taken anywhere in the world such circumstances arose.

He did not oppose the specific decision to

aid Greece and Turkey,

but rather the universal policy that

seemed to grow from the speech.

Kennan believed that such a

policy was not only questionable but impossible.

Walter

Lippmann criticized Truman for beginning a world-wide crusade
on behalf of democracy rather than dealing with a single
American security issue.

Henry Wallace charged the President

with creating a crisis when he should have been revitalizing
the Greek economy.

Truman later acknowledged the risks that

were involved with this policy, but he believed the risks

(69) See European reaction in Wittner, American In~~=
vention, pp. 82-84; see Soviet reaction in Soviet New~, 15
March 1947, p. 4, reprinted in Schlesinger, £ynamics of World
~OW~Er
2:314-15.
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were necessary to protect the freedom and security of free
people. ( 7 0)
Despite criticism of the President's address,

the bill

to aid Greece and Turkey moved rapidly through Congress.
Public hearings began the next week,
commenced on April 8.

and debate in the Senate

Although there was little delay,

path was far from smooth.

Supporters of the President

stressed the need to maintain his credibility.
Robert Taft of Ohio,
ment,

the

Even Senator

who had long warned against overcommit-

was afraid of how opposition would affect Truman's

ability to bargain.

Congressional critics,

however,

outspoken.

Isolationists such a Lawrence H.

can - Ohio)

charged the President with bending to the will of

the large oil companies.

undemocratic governments.

major concern also was the high cost.
North Dakota)

(Republi-

In the process the United States

was bolstering reactionary,

lican -

Smith

were

and Senator

c.

William Lempke

Of
(Repub-

Wayland Brooks. (Republi-

0

can -

Illinois)

accused the Pre sident of imperialism that

could lead to war,
sota)

while Harold Knutson

and Senator William Langer

complained

abo~t

tor Vandenberg,

(Republican - Minne-

(Republican - North Dakota)

the bypassing of the United Nations.
however,

Sena-

succeeded in having the bill amended

to bring it under the United Nations Charter by giving that

(70) See Henderson, "Political and Strategic Interests,"
p. 1000; Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 319-20; Bernstein, "Lippmann
and the Early Cold War," p. 40; Ronald Radosh and Leonard P.
Liggio, "Henry A. Wallace and the Open Door," in Paterson,
££1£ Wa£ Critics, p. 94; and Truman, ~emoirs, 2:101.
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body authority to halt the program if conditions warranted.
Dean Acheson tried to draw attention away from the global
implications of the doctrine by emphasizing the idea of
economic reconstruction.

He insisted that the United States

would consider each request for aid on its own merits.
bill passed the Senate on April 22,
old isolationists voting for it,

with two-thirds of

The
th~

and a slightly diiferent

version passed in the House of Representatives on May B.
After the necessary compromise, the bill was approved in both
houses on May 15.

On May 22,

1947,

President Harry S. Truman

signed the bill to aid Greece and Turkey. (71)
Loy Henderson kept a close eye on the aid program in
Greece.

Almost from the beginning,

Mission for Aid to Greece,

some accused the American

headed by Dwight Griswold,

intervening in Greek politics.

The Director of NEA acknowl-

edged the need for changes in the Greek government,
urged Griswold to be discreet.
warning,

however,

but he

Griswold did not heed the

so Henderson went to Greece to ease tension

and help resolve the situation.
Lincoln MacVeagh,

of

With American Ambassador

Henderson was able to negotiate a center-

right coalition government.

This obvious political interven-

(71) See Paterson, Soviet-American Confro~tation, pp.
200-02; see role of isolationists in Congressional hearings
and details of Senate vote in Doenecke, Not !£ the ~wift, pp.
74-79, 82, 86; Vandenberg, Private ~~~.E!!., p. 350.; Freeland,
Truman Doctrine an£ McCarthyism, pp. lOB-09; John L. Gaddis,
~wa;-the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" Forei~~
~ffair~ 52:2(January 1974): 390; and Kuniholm, Cold WaE in
~~ar !~!· p. 414.
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tion as well as the growing use of propaganda in the Balkans
were controversial issues.

Henderson,

however,

supported

both intervention and propaganda along with the use of the
military if it was needed to save Greece from communist
aggression. (72)

Henderson did not see American intervention

as a threat to Greek sovereignty because the United States
had no designs on. this or any other nation.

It merely wanted

to rescue Greece from economic and communist deprivat·ion.
The program to aid Greece and Turkey was one of the
earliest "costs of containment."

For years Henderson

stressed the need to bolster American interests through economic assistance.

He believed that nations with stablized

economies could meet the challenges of communist propagarida.
Later events of the Cold War,
the Korean conflict,

such as the Berlin blockade and

confirmed the global implications of the

Truman Doctrine speech, but the speech overshadowed the real
purpose of the Greek-Turkish aid program -

to strengthen

these nations to resist the threat of communism.
Kennan,

Jones,

While

and others acknowledged Henderson's contribu-

tions to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine,

their focus

on the consequences of the speech overshadowed the fact that
the original aid program was the product of Loy Henderson and
the NEA staff.

(72) see details of Henderson's activities in Greece in
Wittner, American Interve£tion, pp. 104-05, 111-13,
160-61,
237-39.

CHAPTER IV

THE VILLAIN:
HENDERSON AND THE PALESTINE CRISIS

On May 21,

1947,

Loy Henderson wrote,

be our normal state."(l)

"Crisis seems to

Congress was still debating the

Greek-Turkish aid bill when a special session of the United
Nati9ns General Assembly began considering the Palestine
issue.

What seemed an appropriate policy for Greece and

Turkey was not as workable in the Arab areas of the Near and
Middle East.
backward,

Economic aid programs were of little use to the

agrarian economies of these peoples.

They lacked

the institutional means of. carrying out such programs,

and

the Arabs were reluctant to develop institutions which they
considered Western and foreign.

The establishment of a

foreign policy for these areas was further complicated by the
Arab-Jewish conflict which raged in Palestine.

Not only did

it create instability in an oil-rich part of the world,
making it ripe for the feared communist expansion,

but it

split the heretofore united front presented by the United
States and Great Britain. (2)

Twenty years later a critic

(1) Loy Henderson to Carmel Office, May 21, 1947, Near
Eastern Affairs, 1945-48, Substantive File, LWH Papers.
(2) See Henderson to Office, May 21, 1947, LWH Papers;
and Reitzel, g£it~£ ~~ates FoE~i~£ ~£licy, pp. 209-11.
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wrote in a book review,

"If God as some now say is dead,

He

no doubt died of trying to find an equitable solution to the
Arab-Jewish problem."(3)

This conflict in Palestine pre-

sented the American government with a unique policy problem.
The land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan
River had occupied a special place in the hearts of Jews,
Christians,

and Muslims for centuries,

but the American gov-

ernment took only a vague interest in Palestine prior to the
1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate which fixed its
borders.
entity,

With the emergence

o~

Palestine as a political

the United States faced the challenge of formulating

an appropriate foreign policy.

During the interwar years,

the complexities of the Palestine situation came to the fore.
The. plight of European Jews

dur~ng

World War II heightened

inierest in Palestine as did the growing fear of the Soviet
menace.

It seemed that every corner of the world had a stake

in the fate of the area. (4)
The concerns of
stated.

th~

British,

Arabs,

and Jews are simply

To Great Britain Ealestine was an integral part of

her colonial empire,

and the British faced the same problem

there as in their other colonies -

growing nationalism.

Arab

(3) I. F. Stone, "For a New Approach to the Israeli-Arab
Conflict," New !.£.E~ Review of.!!.£.£~~,. 3 August 1967, p. 5,
Israel-Palestine Printed Material File, Container 11, LWH
Papers.
(4) See Peretz, Mi££le Ea~~ Today, pp. 265-66; and
Milton Plesur, "The Relations Between the United States and
Palestine (1917-1945)," ~E.£ai~, 3:4(1954), p. 469.
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and Jewish nationalists were in constant conflict with the
British authorities and with each other.
viewed the land as rightfully theirs,

The Arab majority

while the Zionists were

determined to have Palestine for their national home. (5)
In the United States the issues were more complex.

The

situation in Palestine was both a domestic issue and a
foreign policy issue.

A large part of the American Jewish

population supported Zionist aspirations,

and their potential

voting strength forced politicians to take notice.

When

combined with the humanitarian desire for the permanent settlement of Europe's displaced Jews,

Zionist influence on

American politics was inescapable.

Because of the political

pressure on elected officials,
State Department had to
of view.
emotion,

Henderson believed that the

mainta~n

a completely objective point

He assessed the situation in Palestine without
prejudice,

or political considerations.

In this

manner the departments of State and Defense viewed the Palestine issue in the contex·t of American foreign policy and
world affairs.

With the United States embarking on a policy

of Soviet containment,

the experts in these departments

believed that Arab oil was vital.

Henderson and other policy

makers in State and Defense were convinced that it was necessary to strengthen relations with the Arab nations,
alienate them by a pro-Zionist policy in Palestine.

( 5 ) ·p e re t z , !1idd1 e East Tod a y,

pp . 1 0 7 - 0 8 .

not
The
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conflict that existed between the domestic concerns,
voiced by the White House Staff,

usually

and the foreign policy

concerns of the two departments resulted in confusion and
mistrust among the presidential advisors. (6)
At the core of the Palestine issue for many Americans,
including Henderson,

was the question of self-determination.

In the Atlantic Charter of 1941,

President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Churchill agreed,

among other things,

that

their countries would "respect the right of all peoples to
choose the form of government under which they will live.
• " ( 7)

Conflict and contradictions arose over this issue .

It

was impossible to reconcile the Arab majority's call for
self-government with the 1917 Balfour Declaration's promise
of a Jewish national home in Palestine. (8)
of Economic Operations in the Middle East,

American Director
James M.

wrote to President Roosevelt in January 1945,

Landis,

"The political

objective implicit in the Jewish State idea will never be
accepted by the Arab nations and is not consistent with the

( 6) See John Snetsinger, .!.E~.!!..L ..!:_he Jewi!!_h Vot~.L ~.!!.£
.!:_he ~_E~ati.£1! of Israel (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1974), pp. 12, 14-15; Margaret Arakie, ~rake!!. Swo_££ of~~!!..::.
!i£~ America.!. .!.!!._Eael ~nd .!:_he ~ales.!:_in~ Tr~~~£y (London:
Quartet Books, 1973), p. 60; Wilson, Decision on ~~le!!.!i.!!.~·
p. 11; and Carr Lecture, LWH Papers.
( 7)

1939-1945
50 •

(8)

Harley Notter, ~£!!_twar Forei~ Policy Pre~_Eatio.!!..L
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p.

Wilson,

Decision on

Pa!estin~,

p.

xv.
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principles of the Atlantic Charter."(9)

Henderson feared

that the abandonment of the principle of self-determination
in Palestine would harm American prestige.

Other nations

would judge the United States as no more trustworthy than the
Soviet Union. (10)
Prior to World War II,
in Palestine was limited.

United States government interest
The State Department usually

filled foreign service posts in the Near East with officers
well acquainted with the area.
sion,

As in the Far Eastern Divi-

the unique problems of these non-Western territories

required the diplomatic skills of knowledgeable officers.
The close association between the foreign service officers
serving in the Near E.ast and the Arab nations gave rise to
charges of pro-Arabism and even anti-Semitism.

Indeed the

·State Department was generally sympathetic to the Arabs'
desire for self-government,

and it believed that the Arab

majority would succeed to power when the Mandate ended.

The

department thus considered Zionist goals in Palestine a
detriment to American relations and interests in the Near
East although every president since Woodrow Wilson affirmed
United States support for the Jewish National Home. (11)

dis)

(9) Director of Economic Operations in Middle East (Lanto Roosevelt, January 30, 1945, FRUS, 12.!11 VIII, 681.

(10) Loy Henderson to Allen H. Podet,
Israel-Palestine File, LWH Papers.

June 9,

1976,

(11) See Baram, £~£artm~nt £f State i£ ~idd!~ ~ast,
51-52; and Wilson, Decision££ ~~~sti£~· pp. 6-7, 18.

pp.
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Other than the obvious importance of Near Eastern oil to
the war effort,

American government interest in Palestine was

also in the background during the war years.
States,

however,

The United

realized the necessity for postwar planning

for the Near East.

A series of State Department studies

attempted to determine the basis for a Palestinian settlement.

In all,

the Near East Office prepared ten comprehen-

sive planning papers for Palestine.

Despite this planning,

a

definite formula for Palestine proved to be elusive. (12)
The State Department was not alone in the making of preparations for postwar Palestine.
Jewry

emerged,

Zionist activities in the United States in-

creased rapidly.
to the war,

As the horrors of European

Zionist leadership centered in Europe prior

but the 1942 Zionist conference in New York sig-

naled the shift in leadership to the United States.

The

Zionists embarked on a propaganda campaign intended to win
the support of the American people and government for the
Jewish State.

The idea.was to link the Jewish refugee prob-

lem with the need for a Jewish nation. (13)
The Zionist campaign was an overwhelming success.

All

areas of the government began to feel pressure to support

(12) See Evan M. Wilson, "The Palestine Papers, 19431947," Jo~~! of Palestine Studies 2 (Summer 1973): 49; Mohammed K. Shadid, ~ United State~~££ th~ ~~.J:.estini~£~ (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 29; and "Palestine: Form
of Government," prepared by State Department, January 30,
1945, FR~ 11~ 1 VIII, 683.
(13)

Wilson,

~~cisi££

££

~ale~~in~,

pp.

24-25,

30-31.
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Zionism.

In 1944 Congressional resolutions supporting Zion-

ist aims passed overwhelmingly in both houses of Congress.
In the summer of 1944,

both parties included planks in their

presidential campaign platforms backing Zionist aims.
Jews,

however,

with a

The

were not the only ethnic or national group

refugee problem,

and the narrow focus on displaced

Jews greatly concerned Henderson.

State Department pleas for

restraint still went unheeded. (14)
The State Department was especially concerned about the
effect that American Zionist activity had on the Arab world.
Arab leaders were anxious and confused about the United
States position on Paleitine.
to President Roosevelt in a
Saudi Arabia in 1943.

These concerns were expressed

letter from King Ibn Saud of

In reply the President promised that

the United States government would take no actions regarding
the situation in Palestine without first consulting both
Arabs and Jews.
first

This formula of full cosultation was the

formal American policy on Palestine.

open to wide interpretation,

Though vague,

and

it provided Henderson and NEA

with a guideline in dealing with disgruntled Arab leaders. (15)
Roosevelt never formulated a coherent policy on Palestine.

He was sympathetic to the Zionists and was aware of

(14) See Wilson, De£isio~ .£!!. Palestine, pp. 40-44; and
Henderson to Lilienthal, Enclosure, March 13, 1977, Lilienthal File, LWH Papers.
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the political strength of this segment of the population;
however,

he also knew that not all American Jews supported

Zionism,

nor could a Jewish State survive without military

force.

The situation in Palestine,

while important,

a critical issue during the war years,
fully evaded a decisive position.

was not

and Roosevelt success-

He believed he could find

a solution to the conflict in Palestine after the war. (16)
By 1945 it was obvious the issue of Palestine was going
to be one of the major challenges of the immediate postwar
years.

Roosevelt revealed his concern when he included a

meeting with Ibn Saud as part of his agenda for the Yalta
Conference.

Despite promises to Ibn Saud,

the President con-

tinually vacillated as the American wartime feeling was
decidedly pro-Zionist.

On March 16,

orized Rabbi Stephen S. Wise,
nist Emergency Council,

1945, Roosevelt auth-

Chairman of the American Zio-

to make a statement affirming his
On April 5,

support of Jewish aspirations in Palestine. (17)
however,

the President sent a letter to Saud reaffirming the

policy of full consultation.

Roosevelt wrote,

"Your Majesty

will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversa-

(16) See Wilson, Decision££ falesti£~,
Wilson, "Palestine Papers," p. 40.

pp.

54-56; and

(17) See Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine:
A Lesson in Pressure Politics," Middle East JO££!!~.!. 2 (January, 1948): 4-5; Wilson, Deci~i££ ££Palestine, 28, 37, 51,
53; and Wallace Murray to Joseph Grew, March 20, 1945, K~~
.!2..!~.t VIII, 694.
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discontent by reaffirming American commitment to full cosultation in letters to Arab leaders. (20)
This marked the last time,

however,

that the State

Department was able to influence Truman's Palestine policy.
Perhaps one reason for this was the lack of interest of Stettinius'

successors.

James Byrnes was seldom in Washington.

One official complained,
Byrnes roams."(21)

"The State Department fiddles while

Byrnes wanted no part of the Palestine

affair and left it almost entirely to the new Under Secretary
of State Dean Acheson.

Secretary of State George Marshall

also delegated Palestine issues to the Under Secretary since
he viewed the problems as being more domestic than foreign in
character.

According to Loy Henderson, Marshall only gave

his personal attention in cases of "extreme urgency."
Byrnes and Marshall, therefore,

Under

the Director of NEA in con-

sultation with the Under Secretary dealt with routine issues.
Under this format the White House decided policy questions
almost entirely on its own. (22)
Truman's view of Palestine was simple in 1945.

He

wanted the British to open Palestine to the immediate immi-

man,

(20) see Wilson, Decision on
Memoirs, 2:132-33.

f~le~ine,

59-60; and Tru-

(21) Joseph Alsop to Martin Sommers, February 3, 1946,
Joseph w. Alsop Papers, Box 1, Library of Congress, quoted in
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold ~~E, p. 347.
(22) see Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp. 59-60; Truman, Mem£ir~, 2:132-33; and Henderson Interview, October 15,
1975, LWH Papers.
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gration of 100,000 Jews then occupying displaced persons
camps in Europe, but he did not want to assume responsibility
for such action either politically or militarily.

The Presi-

dent believed that the western world must keep the Balfour
Declaration's "solemn promise" of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Truman regarded this promise as fundamental to the

principle of self-determination,

a principle which he

affirmed in his Navy Day speech on October 27,

1945,

stating,

"We shall approve no territorial changes in any friendly part
of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed
wishes of the people concerned."(23)
ignore,

however,

His view seemed to

the question of self-determination for the

Arab majority. (24)
The State Department was well aware that American support of large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine would
generate hostility in the Arab world.

The President,

though,

was more concerned with the Jewish refugee problem than with
State Department warnings of reprecussions in the Arab world.
Deeply troubled by this situation,

Truman's solution to the

refugee problem was the lifting of British immigration
restrictions in Palestine.

After Earl G.

Harrison,

the

(23) Louis w. Koenig, ed., The !~~£ Administration:
Its Princi~ ~nd Practices. (Westport: Greenwood Press,
Publishers, 1956), p. 262.
(24) See Acheson, f~ent at the Cre~~ion, p. 170;
Truman, Memoirs, 2:132-33; and Shadid, United Stat~~ and
f~l~~tini~£~· p. 33.
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United States representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees,

reported on conditions in the displaced

persons camps and the desire of the Jews to go to Palestine,
Truman again urged the British to open Palestine to Jewish
refugees.

Truman,

however,

overlooked the other displaced

persons of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States.
The President's disregard of the broader refugee problem
deeply concerned Loy Henderson.

In Henderson's view none of

the displaced person's had an ethnic sanctuary. (25)
President Truman focused his efforts on an immediate
solution to the Jewish refugee problem.

He viewed the short

and long-range considerations as completely separate.

Truman

believed the question of a Jewish State was a matter that the
United Nations should address at a later date. (26)

In his

Me!!!oirs the President later wrote,

the aims

"In my own mind,

and goals of the Zionists at this stage to set up a Jewish
state were secondary to the more immediate problem of finding
means to relieve the human misery of the displaced persons."(27)

(25) see Snetsinger, TrumanL th~ Jewish Vo~, p. 17;
Truman, Memoirs, 2:132; Clark M. Clifford, "Factors Influencing President Truman's Decision to Support Partition and
Recognize the State of· Israel," The f~_!estin~ Question in
~!!!~Eican History (New York: Arno Press, 1978), pp. 25-26; and
Henderson to Lilienthal, Enclosure, March 13, 1977, LWH
Papers.
(26) see Truman, Memoirs,
the Cre~!i£~· p. 170.
{ 2 7)

Truman·, Me!!!£ig,

2:140; and Acheson, fresent at

2: 14 4- 4 5.
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His Palestine policy satisfied no one.

The British

resented Truman's pressure to increase immigration into their
Mandate territory,
and the Jews.

for they had to consider both the Arabs

The Zionists wanted the administration to

endorse the Jewish State.
as hostile. (28)
wrote,

"Why,

The Arabs viewed Truman's position

Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha

from a perfectly objective point of view,

one

small nation of 1,000,000 people living in a small territory
should be forced to accept in 25 years immigrants of an alien
race up to nearly 50 per cent of their own number is hard to
understand."(29)
Loy Henderson realized the problems involved with any
policy that gave advantage to one side over the other.

He

suggested to Secretary Byrnes that the United States try to
reach an agreement with the British,
the future of Palestine.

Soviets,

and French for

In this way no one country would

have to bear the responsibility.

Henderson recommended a

Palestine trusteeship with Jewish and Arab autonomy. (30)
Whether the President learned of this advice is unknown,
but Truman continued to follow his own course. (31)

As early

(28) See Snetsinger, Trum~ th~ Jewish Vote,
British Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman,
16, 1945, I~USL 1945, VIII, 740.

p. 18; and
September

(29)

Truman,

~~oirs,

2:134.

(30) See Acheson, Present at the Creation,
Wilson, Decision ££ ~~lestine, p. 66.
(31)

Acheson,

~E~~~nt

~! !£~

£reati££,

p.

p.

170.

170; and
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as September 1945 Gordon Merriam wrote to Henderson,
seems apparent to me that the President
Byrnes as well)

"It

(and perhaps Mr.

have decided to have a go at Palestine nego-

tiations without bringing NEA into the picture.
In October 1945 the President agreed to

."(32)

join with the British

in forming the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

The

British suggested that the committee study the problem of
Europe's displaced Jews with Palestine as one possible alternative for meeting their needs.

As the Mandate authority,

the British realized the hostility that existed between Arabs
and Jews because of their conflicting aspirations in Palestine.

Great Britain feared that any change in immigration

policies would only add fuel to the fires of discontent.
Unknown to the State Department,

President Truman informed

the British that the United States would only take part in
the committee if Palestine was the focal point.
reluctantly agreed.

The British

The Anglo-American approach to the Pal-

estine issue without including the other major powers gave
the Soviets the opportunity to incite Jewish and Arab opposition to the committee's proposals.

Henderson's concern that

the United States would have to bear responsibility for
Palestine proved correct. (33)

l1i~'

(32) Merriam to Henderson,
VIII, 745-46.

September 26,

1945, fRUS,

(33) See Truman, Memoirs, 2:141-42; Acheson, Pr~sen~ ~~
the Creation, p. 172; Alfred W. Lilienthal to Loy Henderson,
February 16, 1977, and Henderson to Lilienthal, Enclosure,
March 13, 1977, Lilienthal File, LWH Papers.
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Despite the administration's apparent lack of interest
in the department's advice,

Henderson continued to express
Early in 1946 he prepared a

his views on the Near East.

memorandum for Acheson and Hickerson offering his opinion on
the danger the Near East presented to world peace.

He stated

that America's most important interest in the area was not
oil,

but the preservation of stability and the principles of

the United Nations in order to prevent actions that might
lead to another world war.

Henderson explained that the

Great Powers were pursuing four different policies in the
area.

The United States was not going to use force to imple-

ment its policies,

nor was it inclined to provide the econo-

mic assistance needed in the Near East.
that America's

He further stated

seeming support for the Zionist cause in

Palestine which was opposed by two-thirds of the population
was having an adverse effect on attempts to carry out government policies in the region.

Henderson was aware of the

growing nationalism in the Arab world and of the people's
desire to improve their living standards.

He believed that

only political and economic stability would protect the Near
East from outside powers.

As in Greece and Turkey Henderson

urged that the United States economically aid in developing
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Near Eastern countries and encourage the adoption of American
principles. (34)
While Henderson's advice appeared to fall on deaf ears
in the White House,

the report of the Committee of Inquiry

supported several of his earlier suggestions.
the report

Published on

May 1,

1946,

tine.

The committee stressed the necessity of adopting the

pr~posed

ten points regarding Pales-

entirety of its proposal with concessions balanced on each
side.

The report stated that while Palestine offered the

best location for settling large numbers of displaced Jews,
it could not and should not bear the entire burden.

The

report recommended the immigration of 100,000 Jews but prohibited either the Jews or the Arabs from dominating the other.
Since there was so much hostility,

the committee recommended

continuation of the Mandate until the establishment of a
United Nations trusteeship.
educational,

political,

Arabs and Jews should have equal

and economic qpportunities under both

the Mandate and the trusteeship. (35)

Henderson praised the

report for being "a thorough and conscientious piece of work"
which "produced a set of general recommendations which con-

(34) See Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson and John Hickerson, "The Present Situation in the Near East - A Danger to
World Peace," undated, Ig~ 194~, VII, 1-4; and Henderson,
I2reig~ Policies, pp. 14-16.
(35) See Wilson, Decision~ Palestine, p. 87; and Dean
Acheson to American Diplomatic and Consular Offices, April
25, 1946, FRUS.L 1946, VII, 585-86.
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stitute a reasonable and intelligently-defined compromise
solution.

• " ( 3 6)

Feelings toward the report outside of the State Department were not quite so positive.

Truman endorsed the admis-

sion of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and several other of the
points, but he reserved judgment on the rest of the report
pending further study.
British.

His partial acceptance angered the

Prime Minister Clement Attlee stated that Great

Britain would not undertake the long-term commitments the
report required until it determined how much responsibility
the United States would share.

He also rejected the admis-

sion of 100,000 Jewish immigrants as long as Jewish terrorism
continued since the United States was unwilling to accept
obligations in Palestine which would require a military presIn the United States the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ence.

reported that not only would military involvement harm American interests in the Near East but that the armed forces did
not have enough manpower to police the region in light of
other commitments. (37)
Jews and Arabs alike strongly opposed the committee
report.

The Zionists wanted a Jewish State,

desired an Arab State.

fRU~

and the Arabs

The trusteeship proposal satisfied

(36) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson,
1946, VII, 587.

April 24,

1946,

(37) See Wilson, Decision Q!! Palesti!!~.r p, 89; Truman,
Memoirs, 2:149; and Joint Chiefs ~f Staff to State-War-Navy
C~~~cti~ating Committee, June 21, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VII, 632.
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neither group.

The Arabs especially resented the interfer-

ence of the American government in the affairs of an Arab
country. (38)
Despite the lack of agreement on the Report of the
Anglo-American Committee of Inquizy,

Truman continued to

press the British for the admittance of 100,000 Jews into
Palestine.

Henderson suggested that the administration

needed more than pressure.

He believed that

between the United States and Great Britain

joint planning
wa~

necessary to

overcome such barriers to mass immigration as transportation,
housing,

financing,

tate this planning,
State,

War,

and terrorism in Palestine.

To facili-

Truman appointed the Secretaries of

and Treasury as a Cabinet Committee on Palestine.

Most of the Committee's work was done by three alternates Henry F. Grady of the State

Depar~ment,

representing the War Department,
the Treasury Department.

Goldthwaite H. Dorr

and Herbert E.

Gaston from

With Grady chairing the trio,

alternates went to London on July 10,

1946,

the

to discuss the

findings of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. (39)
In London the British proposed a plan which called for a
Jewish province and an Arab province.
was to be basically autonomous,

Although each province

a central government would

(38) Mohammed Shafi Agwani, Th~ Qni~~£ State~ ~nd th~
Arab WorldL 12.15-ll~ (Aligarh, India: Institute of Islamic
Studies, 1955), p. 67.
(39)
at ~h~
p. 92.

See Truman, Me~£iE~· 2:150-51; Acheson, Pres~£~
p. 174; and Wilson, Decisi££ ££ ~ales~ine,

~tion,
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retain control over some policies among which was immigration.

The British plan advocated the admission of 100,000

Jews into Palestine only after Jews and Arabs approved the
entire program.

Grady urged the President to accept the plan

even though the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had
rejected this alternative.

The Ambassador believed that due

to British resistance this was the only way mass Jewish
immigration could occur in the near future.

Truman recalled

Grady and his committee, however,

when information leaked to

the press,

opp~sition

arousing angry Zionist

to the proposal.

Despite Truman's resulting unwillingness to give immediate
endorsement to the plan,
as a

joint program

Plan. (40)

the British published the proposal

which became known as the Morrison-Grady

.

Oppoiition to the Morrison-Grady Plan was widespread.
The Zionists refused even to discuss the plan with the British,

while the Arabs rejected all alternatives other than

Palestine becoming an Arab country.

Public opinion in the

United States was so opposed to the plan that on August 12,
1946,

Truman informed Prime Minister Attlee of his inability

to support the proposal. (41)
Truman's rejection of the
ended hope for a

M~rrison-Grady

Plan virtually

joint British-American solution to the

(40)

Wilson,

Decision on Palestine, pp.

(41)

Truman, Memoirs,

2: 152-53.

93-94.
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Palestine issue.

The Zionists,

however,

were beginning to

realize that the 1942 Biltmore Program's goal of Palestine as
a Jewish State was unrealistic in light of Arab hostility.
Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of
the World Jewish Congress,

supported by the Jewish Agency

Executive, began to press for the partition of Palestine.
Headquartered in London,

the Jewish Agency had promoted the

idea of a Jewish national home since 1929,
wide fundraising effort.
Executive,

In Jerusalem the Jewish Agency

led by David Ben-Gurion,

the Palestinian Jews.

leading the world-

organized and represented

The new Zionist program advocated the

creation of a Jewish State in part rather than all of PalesWhile Zionists viewed this as a compromise on their

tine.
part,

the Arabs disagreed.

The fact that the Zionists

claimed only a part rather than all of Palestine represented
an unacceptable Arab concession.
the proposal,

Despite Arab opposition to

President Truman reacted favorably to the par-

tition plan. (42)
By September 1946 the Zionist leaders pressured Truman
to endorse publicly the Agency's partition plan.

The State

Department once more counseled the President to act with
caution.

Henderson and other department officials feared a

presidential statement would impede the Anglo-Arab negotiations in progress in London.

Peretz,

The dissolution of the London

( 4 2 ) See ·w i ls on , Dec i s ion on P a le~ t in e ,
Middle §ast Today, p. 274.

pp .

94- 96;

and
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meetings,

however,

prompted Truman to act.

On October 3 the

President notified Attlee that he intended to make a statement on Palestine.

In his message to the Prime Minister,

he

included the text of a speech he planned to deliver the next
day,

the eve of the sacred Jewish holiday Yorn Kippur.

In the

statement Truman recounted his efforts to achieve a solution
to the refugee problem,
100,000 Jews. (43)

calling again for the admission of

Although he did not actually endorse the

Jewish partition plan,

he expressed the "belief that a solu-

tion along these lines would command the support of public
opinion in the United States."(44)
Acheson recalled that

Republic~n

candidates attacked the

so-called Yorn Kippur Statement "as a blatant play for the
Jewish vote."(45)

In fact,

gubernatorial and Congressional

election campaigns were raging.
can candidate for governor,
port Zionism publicly,

Believing that the Republi-

Thomas Dewey,

was going to sup-

the New York Democrats pressured Tru-

man to issue this statement.
of the White House Staff,

Rumors also spread that members

such as Administrative Assistant

(43) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p .. 97; and President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee, October, 1946, FRQ~
1946, VII, 703.

3,

(44)
19 4 6,
(45)

President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee,
19 4 6, VI I, 7 0 3.

FR~

Acheson,

Present at the

fre~tion,

p.

176.
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David K.

Niles,

had influenced the President to help Dernoc-

rats obtain the Jewish vote. (46)
President Truman defended the Yorn Kippur Statement as
being "simply a restatement of my position."(47)

He

explained to Prime Minister Attlee that the purpose of the
~

statement was to express America's continued concern for the
welfare of the d{iplaced Jews in Europe.

The President

reitterated his appeal for the British to increase Jewish
immigration to Palestine. (48)
The State Department did not share Truman's narrow focus
on the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine.
Henderson's views, Gordon Merriam,
Division,

Echoing ·

Chief of the Near Eastern

stated that a worldwide refugee program as well as

a resolution of the entire Palestine question were both
neces~ary

Palestine.

to achieve the objective of Jewish immigration into
Merriam accused the administration of basing its

Palestine policy on expediency rather than principle.

He

believed that the United States should strive for the independence of all Palestine based on an agreement between Arabs

(46) See Roosevelt, "Partition of Palestine,: p. 12; and
James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis
(New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 347.
(47)

10,

Truman, Memoirs,

2:154.

(48) President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee,
1946, FRU~ 1946, VII, 706-07.

October
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and Jews.

While Palestine prepared for independence, Merriam

recommended a United Nations trusteeship. (49)
In transmitting Merriam's views to Under Secretary Acheson,

Loy Henderson noted his concern for the direction of

American policy.

The administration's support for the parti-

tion of Palestine made Henderson uneasy,

for he questioned

whether this policy conformed with American principles.
Despite his misgivings,

Henderson forwarded suggestions to

the administration to aid the government in preparing the
United States delegation to the United Nations.

The United

States delegation entered the discussions with three position
papers.

The first paper called for the American delegation

to state United States policy only if another delegation
raised the question of Palestine.

This suggestion reflected

the inability of the United States to present a detailed
Palestine program.

The second alternative was for the dele-

gation to support strongly a
issue along Zionist lines.

resolution of the Palestine
This action would clarify the

American position on Palestine.

The State Department warned

that this alternative could have serious consequences for
American economic and strategic· interests in the Near East.
The third position paper called for the delegation to recommend a moderate plan that did not specifically support parti-

(49) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 99;
Gordon Merriam to Loy Henderson, December 27, 1946,
l.2_1.§., VII, 733-34 . .

and
FRQ~L
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tion.

This plan would attempt to bring about independence

for the area while providing for the immigration of 100,000
Jews.

The State Department again cautioned that the Arab

world would probably react unfavorably to this position.

If

the government decided to follow either the second or third
alternative,

however,

Henderson and NEA recommended that the

United States inform both the British and the Zionists of
America's exact position and its implications.

Henderson

·continued to urge consideration of the entire international
picture when making decisions on Palestine. (50)
Despite the efforts of the State Department to provide
the Truman Administration with policy guidelines,

some

accused department officials of attempting to sabotage the
President's Palestine policy.

Bartley

c.

Crum,

an American

representative on the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry,
believed that department assurances to the Arab world served
only to negate Truman's pro-Jewish policy.
cially critical of Henderson.

When asked by the press to be

more specific in his accusations,
salutary thing if Mr.
requested."(51)

Loy W.

Crum was espe-

Crum stated,

"It would be a

Henderson's resignation were

NEA and other department offices,

in fact,

had opposed Crum's appointment to the Committee of Inquiry,

(50) Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, October 21, 1946,
and Merriam to Henderson, December 27, 1946, KRU~L 1946, VII,
710-13, 732.
Ii~~'

(51) "U.S. Aides Accused on Palestine Issue," New York
22 August 1946, p. 8.
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believing him to be publicity-seeking and untrustworthy due
to his association with some "United Front" organizations.
But Henderson never understood why Mr. Crum chose to attack
him personally.
complaints,

Other critics were more specific with their

charging that Henderson was so anti-Soviet that

he would do anything to bolster the British in the Near
East.(52)
Despite the so-called pro-Arab State Department,

the

Arab world's distrust of the Truman Administration's Palestine policy reduced United States prestige in the Near East.
Arab concern also stemmed from the Zionist activities in
Palestine.

Underground Jewish military organizations such as

the Haganah and the Irgun conducted terrorist campaigns
throughout the territory.

In addition the Jewish Agency

Executive was carrying out illegal immigration on a large
scale.

The Arabs viewed these actions as a threat to their

present safety and to their future existence.
tions with Henderson,

In conversa-

Arab emissaries urged the United States

not to confuse the refugee problem with political Zionism.
They failed to understand how the United States,

even in the

name of humanity,· could reconcile its support of the Jewish

(52) See Henderson to Lilenthal, Enclosure, March 13,
1977, LWH Papers; Loy Henderson to Henry F. Grady, September
7, 1946, Near Eastern Affairs, 1945-48, General File, Container 12, LWH Papers; and Loy Henderson to Mr. Mandel, July
24, 1946, Near Eastern Substantive File, LWH Papers.
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minority with the American principle of majority rule. (53)
In a letter to President Truman,

King Ibn Saud wrote,

is the fundamental basis of the whole problem.

"This

For the

principles of democracy dictate that when a majority exists
in a country,
majority,

the government of that country shall be by the

and not the minority."(54)

The United States and

Great Britain were caught in a web of contradictory promises
and principles.

While some hope rested on the United Nations

to untangle the mess,
1947,

Arthur M. Schlesinger,

the grand halls of the U.N.

Jr.,

wrote,

"In

were thick with chickens

coming home to roost."(55)
When Great Britain referred the Palestine

i~sue

to the

United Nations in April 1947, the Arab states called on the
General Assembly to end the mandate and to proclaim the independent state of Palestine.

The proposal failed,

and on the

recommendation of the United States, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

(UNSCOP)

gate the entire Palestine situation.
neutral states,

was formed to invest!Composed of eleven

the General Assembly ordered the Committee to

submit its findings by September.

During the UNSCOP investi-

(53) See Forrestal, Di~ries, p. 180; Wilson, ~~cisi££
££ Palestin~, p. 67; and memorandum of conversation between
Marshall, Henderson, and Abdel Rahman Azzam Pasha, June 17,
1947, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers.
(54)
f~US,

Ibn Saud to President Truman,
VII, 718-19.

November 2,

1946,

!~.!.§.,

(55) Schlesinger, Dynamics £!~£Eld ~ewer, vol.
Nations, ed. by Richard C. Hottelet, p. 341.
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gations,

the United States pursued a policy of caution.

the Cold War heating up,

With

the State Department did not want to

risk a loss of American influence or a gain for Soviet prestige in the Near East. (56)
Although Great Britain was withdrawing from certain
strategic areas,

such as Greece and Turkey,

her referral of

the Palestine question to the United Nations did not indicate
a desire to leave Palestine.

The British merely wanted the

General Assembly to advise them on administering the Mandate.
As late as February 1947, they proposed to resolve the situation by reducing the problem to a local issue between the
Arabs and Jews of Palestine rather than the world.

Fearing

the opposition which the British proposals would arouse,

Loy

Henderson advised that the United States ref rain from commenting on the British program.

While the United States and

Great Britain had common economic and strategic interests in
the area,

the anticipated hostile American public opinion

toward the proposals

fo~ced

the State Department to be

extremely cautious in its support of the British. (57)

(56) See Wilson, Decisi.£.!! on Palestine, pp. 107-08; and
George T. Mazuzan, "United States Policy toward Palestine at
the United Nations, 1947-48: An Essay," frol,2!!~, 7:3 (1975),
p. 167.
(57) See Wilson, Decision on fal~tine, p. 105; Loy
Henderson to Dean Acheson, February 10, 1947, FRUSL !2.!1r V,
1038-39; and J. C. Hurewitz, The Stru_g_g_le for Palestine (New
York: Schocken Books, 1976), p. 300.
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Henderson urged that the United States remain neutral
He believed

during the Special Committee's investigation.

that serious consideration of the Committee's report required
This need for impartiality was

United States impartiality.

especially necessary when dealing with the Jewish Agency.
Henderson feared that any secret conversation with the off icial representatives of the

Palestin~an

Jews would raise

suspicion among the Arabs and ruin any chance for the success
of UNSCOP.

He did,

however,

suggest that the Agency place

its concerns before the Special Committee. (58)
The State Department's repeated call for caution,
tiality,

impar-

and a Palestine policy consistent with the interna-

tional objectives of the government led to public charges of
anti-Zionism.
Department,

Viewed as the embodiment of the pro-Arab State

Loy Henderson,

focus of this criticism.
ings,

as the Director of NEA,

was the

Regardless of his personal feel-

Henderson continued to urge the formulation of an

acceptable Palestine policy based on cooperation between
department officials,

the President's staff,

Congress,

interested Americans,

including American Jews.

and

He believed

this was the only approach to formulate a policy that could
withstand the pressures which were sure to arise during a

(58)
1942,

v,

Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, May 29,
1093-94.

1947, FRUS,
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United Nations debate. (59)

Henderson was extremely concerned

with the increased emotionalism connected to the Palestine
issue.

On January 5,

Jerusalem,

1948,

he wrote to Dr.

Ellen Simon in

"It seems to me that the situation has developed

to such an extent that actions are being motivated by emotion
rather than reason.

• " ( 6 0)

Within the State Department,

Henderson continued to pur-

sue the course of reason and to plan for the future of Palestine.

A position paper dated June 4,

1947 called for a

uninational Palestinian state, which was neither Arab nor
Jewish,

that provided equal rights and privileges to all

citizens.

Although not a Jewish National Home in the politi-

cal sense,

Palestine would provide a cultural and spiritual

home for Jews with citizens of all religions participating in
the governance.
tory.

Immigration laws would be non-discrimina-

Until the governmental machinery was in operation,

the

plan suggested that the United Nations administer Palestine
under a trusteeship of ~ither one or more member nations or a
trusteeship council.

The trustee would prepare Palestine for

self-government and independence.

c.

Ross,

In a discussion with John

Deputy to United Nations Ambassador Warren Austin,

(59) see Joseph B. Schechtman, The ~nite£ ~~tes and th~
Jewish ~~ate Movement (New York: Herzl Press, 1966), pp. 40911; and Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, February 17. 1947,
KRU~L 1947, v, 1051.
(60)
Papers.

Loy Henderson to Ellen Simon,

January 5,

1948,

LWH
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Henderson stressed that this plan was merely a working paper;
however,

it did indicate the policy which NEA hoped to per-

suade the administration to pursue. (61)
During the summer of 1947, the State Department's Office
of Near Eastern and African Affairs and Office of Special
Political Affairs prepared four alternative plans for the
future government of Palestine:
described above;

2)

1)

a uninational state as

a binational state - one state with

Jewish and Arab communities;

3)

a partition plan calling for

a Jewish state to consist of the 1,500 square miles in which
there was a Jewish majority;

4)

partition as in plan three

but to include the 5,000 square miles of the Negev,
desert area.

largely a

Neither of the partition plans gave the Jews

control of areas in which there was an Arab majority.

In

presenting these four plans ·to the Secretary of State,

Hen-

derson stated that a uninational state not only represented
the best international interest of the United States, but it
also conformed more to the principles of the United Nations
Charter.

He realized that this plan was idealistic and

probably unattainable in light of the hostilities in Palestine.

A binational state would also probably be unacceptable

to Arabs and Jews; however,

he expressed concern for the

problems which would inevitably arise from any form of parti-

(61) "A Plan for the Future Government of Palestine,"
initial draft prepared by Henderson, June 4, 1947, FRU~L
1947, v, 1096-1100; for notes on Henderson-Ross conversation,
;;;-footnote, FRUS, 1947, V, 1096.
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tion. (62)

Henderson especially disagreed with plan number

four since the Negev had an extremely small Jewish population
and its incorporation in the Jewish State would create what
he termed "another Polish Corridor."(63)
Henderson continued to recommend that the United States
delegation act with caution.

He suggested that the govern-

ment withhold any solution until UNSCOP presented its report
and the British,
ions.

Jews,

and Arabs had expressed their opin-

The United States should then take a position accord-

ing to both the international climate and the results of the
Assembly debates.

Any presentation of United States views

should be as an elaboration of the proposals of other
nations.

In this way Henderson believed that the United

States could avoid having the adopted program labeled an
American plan. (64)
The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine submitted its report on August 31,
unanimously agreed to

t~rminate

pendence to Palestine.

1947.

The eleven members

the Mandate and grant inde-

The United Nations would maintain

responsibility for Palestine until independence and also
protect the Holy Places.

(62)
!RU~L

The majority of the committee also

Loy Henderson to George Marshall,
V, 1120-22.

July 7,

1947,

1.2.il•

(63) Henderson to Lilienthal,
LWH Papers.
(64)
1122-23.

Henderson to Marshall,

Enclosure, March 13,

July 7,

1947,

FRUSL

1977,

1.2.il• v,
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agreed that Palestine alone should not bear the entire burden
of the displaced Jews.

The committee split on the nature of

the government of Palestine.
with economic union.
Arab State,

Seven members favored partition

This provided for a Jewish State,

an

and an international trusteeship for Jerusalem.

The committee,

however,

any form of partition.

realized that problems existed with
Arabs outnumbered Jews two to one,

and no real territorial separation existed.
the committee felt,

though,

to the urgent problem.

The majority of

that partition was the solution

At that time almost 18,000 illegal

immigrants were under British detention,
tinians were incarcerated.

and over 800 Pales-

The minority report,

stating the

view that partition would only heighten Arab-Jewish separatism and cause irredentism,

proposed a federal state. (65)
Neither plan was

Reactions to. the report were varied.

acceptable to the Arabs, but the Jewish Agency reluctantly
accepted the partition plan.

Public opinion in the United

States also favored the. majority report.
ever,

The British,

viewed partition as unworkable and unfair.

how-

There was

also opposition to the majority plan in the Pentagon and the
State Department. (66)

(65) See Wilson, Decision on Palestine, p. 111; and
William R. Polk, The United ~!~tes and. the ~rab ~orld (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 178-79.
(66)

Wilson,

Decision£~ ~alestin~,

p.

115.
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Loy Henderson believed it was not in the best interest
of the United States to support any form of partition or the
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, because it
would alienate the Arab and Muslim worlds at a time when
their friendship was crucial.
States,

In addition,

as an advocate of the plan,

the United

would have to provide the

necessary economic and military aid to implement partition.
Henderson viewed the plan as unworkable since it was not
acceptable to both the Arabs and Jews.
between Arabs and Jews,

Without cooperation

economic unity would be impossible.

He believed that the failure to cooperate would result in the
Palestine question arising again in the United Nations in a
few years.
felt

Henderson also opposed the UNSCOP plan because he

it contradicted the principles of majority rule and

self-determination.

While he believed that the United States

should insure equality for Jews in Palestine,

he did not

think that either the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate
obligated the United States to aid in the creation of a
Jewish State.

Henderson,

therefore,

recommended that the

United States take an impartial position in the upcoming
United Nations debate.

He urged American open-mindedness,

while directing its efforts toward the agreements necessary
for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship.

This neu-

tral trusteeship would administer Palestine for a stated
period of time,

at the conclusion of which the citizens of
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Palestine would vote on the partition question.

The General

Assembly would then make its final decision on partition. (67)
President Truman did not share Henderson's views on
Palestine.

He believed that the UNSCOP plan would encourage

Arabs and Jews to work together as neighbors.

The President

also felt that it was important to support the efforts of the
United Nations in Palestine as an expression of confidence in
that body.

Under instructions from Mr.

Truman,

the United

States delegation announced its support of the partition plan
on October 11,

1947.

Two days later,

the Soviet Union also

endorsed the plan in what some observers believed was an
attempt to foster Arab rejection of the Western world. (68)
Once the United States publicly stated its support of
partition,

Henderson once more tried to formulate an accept-

able policy position in light of the international scene.

He

advised that while the United States delegation should support the partition plan as instructed,

the United States

should not follow an aggressive policy in the General Assembly,

since neither the government nor the American people

were willin~ to bear the responsibility for the enfo~cement
of the plan.

1947,

He believed,

however,

that a

(67) Loy Henderson to George Marshall,
FRUSL 1947, V, 1154-58.
(68)

See Truman, Memoirs,
pp. 122-23.

£~ ~~lesti~~'

non~aggressive

September 22,

2:156-57; and Wilson,
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policy would doom the plan to failure at which time the
General Assembly could reconsider the trusteeship plan. (69)
The Zionists,

however,

exerted constant pressure on both

the United Nations and the White House.
stated that the United

Sta~es

While the President

should not attempt to influence

other nations to support _partition,

Evan Wilson noted that

Nahum Goldman and David Horowitz of the Jewish Agency credited Truman with applying pressure to various delegations.
According to Robert J. Donovan, members of the White House
Staff,

including Clark Clifford and David K. Niles,

as ·members of Congress,

as well

used their positions to influence the

votes of smaller nations such as the Philippines and Haiti.
The United States delegation received conflicting instructions on whether or not to use persuasion on other delegations.

Reports of United States pressure tactics caused

bitterness among the Arab nations.

Henderson informed the

Under Secretary of State, Robert L.

Lovett,

that his office

was deeply concerned about the effect that United States
policy at the United Nations was having on American international interests,

especially in the Arab world.

Henderson

believed that Near East security was vital and that Arab
friendship was necessary.

He also believed that American

activities in the United Nations were generating mistrust and
hostility among the Arabs.

(69)
FRQ~L

He again reminded the President

Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett,
V, 1195-96.

11..11•

October 22,

1947,
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that partition would lead to violence and probably require
United States military intervention. (70)
Despite these warnings the administration continued to
support partition.

On November 29,

1947,

the General Assem-

bly passed a recommendation to adopt an amended version of
the UNSCOP proposal.

This plan awarded fifty-three percent

of Palestine to the Jewish State,

although Jews owned only

seven percent of the land in the area.
sion would oversee the partition.
ists around the world.

The Palestine Commis-

The plan delighted Zion-

Arabs responded to the vote the next

day with the call for a general strike and an attack on Jews
in Palestine.

Henderson informed the Arab world that the

United States decision to support partition was final and the
use of violence would not cause the administration to change
its position.
partition plan.

He,

therefore,

urged the Arabs to accept the

The British reacted to the United Nations

vote on December 3,

when they announced that they would end

their mandate on May 15~

1948. (71)

(70) see Truman, Memoirs, 2:158; Donovan, Conflict and
Crisis, pp.329-30; Wilson, Decision .912 Palestine, pp. 127-28;
Ch~;ge Dorsz (Iraq) to George Marshall, .November 5, 1947, and
Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett, November 24, 1947, FRUS,
1942, v, 1240, 1281-82.
(71) see Wilson, Decision on Palestine, pp.
Memorandum of conversation between Loy Henderson
Minister Jamali (Iraq), December 11, 1947, KRU~
v,1311; Truman, ~oirs, 2:159; and Schlesinger,
Power, 5:342.

127-28;
and Foreign
1947,
Dynamics of
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The United Nations recommendation to partition Palestine
insured that United States Palestine policy would be an issue
in the 1948 election.

As in 1946, New York Democratic Party

leaders called on the administration to take positive action
on behalf of the Zionist cause in order to enhance the party's chances in November.

Many government officials feared

the consequences of a foreign policy based on political
considerations rather than international concerns.
ForrestAl,

the first Secretary of Defense,

James V.

was especially

persistent in his quest to remove Palestine from the 1948
campaign.

Although both the President and his opponent,

Governor Thomas Dewey,

agreed with Forrestal in principle,

neither candidate believed it was possible to remove Palestine from the campaign.

Forrestal's growing fear that this

political issue would irreparably damage American-Muslim
relations,

or even result in war,

tary of State to speak with Mr.
efforts,

however,

were in vain.

such as Franklin D.

Roosevelt,

led him to ask the Secre-

Truman.

All of Forrestal's

Democratic Party leaders,
Jr.,

believed that it was too

late for the administration to retreat from its position on
Palestine and that any agreement between the two parties
would hurt Democratic chances in the election. (72)

( 7 2) See Clayton Knowles, "Help for Palestine Urged on
Truman to Save State Vote," Ne!! Yo_;:~ _!imes, February 21,
1948, p. 1; and Forrestal, Dia_;:ies, pp. 22, 348, 359-60, 363.
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Although Forrestal's attempts to remove the Palestine
issue from the political arena failed,

he continued to speak

in opposition to the administration's endorsement of partition.

The Arab nations, meanwhile,

used American dependency

on Near Eastern oil as a weapon in an attempt to force the
administration into a more pro-Arab position.

The possibi-

lity of the United States losing access to the oil fields of
the Near East deeply concerned the Secretary of Defense. (73)
A more immediate problem was the growing violence
between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.
a brutal retaliation.

Each attack resulted in

Over one thousand people died from

violence in Palestine from November 1947 to mid-February
1948.

Neighboring Arab nations prepared to aid their bro-

thers in Palestine.
ernments of Syria,

Reports reached Henderson that the govLebanon,

to fight in Palestine.

and Iraq were training soldiers

There were rumors that some of these

outside forces were already taking part in the disturbances
in Palestine.

It was avident that implementation of parti-

tion would require force,

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were

(73) See Snetsinger,. Truman,
and Forrestal, Diaries, p. 357.

j:__h~

Jewish Vote,

pp.

82-83;
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already on record as opposing the use of American troops in
the Near East. (74)
The continued fear that the United States might be drawn
into an Arab-Jewish war,

as well as the concern for the loss

of American prestige in the area,

led Kennan's Policy Plan-

ning Staff to recommend that the United States refrain from
any initiative to implement partition.

Henderson pointed out

that the General Assembly's plan was merely a recommendation
and that peace in the area should be the main objective,

not

implementation of the recommendation.

Since partition was

unworkable in light of Arab hostility,

NEA urged the adminis-

tration to withdraw its support. (75)
These calls for a reevaluation of American Palestine
policy came at a time when the international situation was
growing more tense.

The·communist take over in Czechoslos-

vakia fueled the fears of Soviet expansion.

Peace in Pales-

tine was of great importance in view of United States obligations in Western Europ~.

Unable to stem the mounting

(74) See memorandum of conversation between representatives of Jewish Agency and Loy Henderson, January 6, 1948,
and George Marshall to Legation in Syria, February 10, 1948,
United States Department of State, Foreig_£ Relations of th~
~~it~~ Sta~~~L 1948
(Washington, 1976), v, pt. 2, 538, 616;
"Bad Medicine," Time, 16 February 1948, p. 24; Joint Chiefs
of Staff to Coordinating Committee, June 21, 1946, FRUS,
!1iii VII, 632; and Peretz, Middle East Tod~, pp.283-84.
(75) See George Kennan to George
1948, and "The Partition of Palestine
Security," prepared by Samuel Kopper
FR~~L !1ii1 V, pt. 2, 546-54, 564-66;
p. 3 62.

Marshall, January 20,
and United States
(NEA), January 27, 1948,
and Forrestal, Qiari~.~_,
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violence,

the Palestine Commission asked the Security Council

to intervene,

but the United States opposed the idea.

the President's consent,

With

Ambassador Warren Austin presented a

position paper to the United Nations Security Council on
February 24,

1948.

He asserted that while the Security Coun-

cil could interfere in Palestine to maintain peace,

it did

not have the legal authority to enforce partition.

The other

Council members agreed. (76)
It was becoming increasingly obvious that any attempt to
impose partition would result in even more chaos.

Secretary

of State George Marshall thus directed Ambassador Austin to
make a previously authorized statement before the Security
Council.

On March 19,

1948, Austin recommended that the

Council establish a trusteeship for Palestine in order to
restore peace and to give Palestinian Arabs and Jews an
opportunity to work out their differences.
however,

The trusteeship,

was not to influence the final political settlement

in any way. (77)
Austin's statement brought charges that the State
Department's position sabotaged the President's policy and

(76) See Schlesinger, £Y£~ics of WO£l~ Po~, 5:342;
Snetsinger, TrumanL th~ Jewish Vote, p. 85; and "Message to
the President," prepared by State Department, February 21,
1948, FRUS.!.. 1:_948, V, pt. 2, 637-40.
(77) See Wilson, Decisi.£!! on Palestine, p. 135; and
George Marshall to Warren Austin, March 16, 1948, and Austin
statement before Security Council, March 19, 1948, FR~
.!1.!~.. v, pt. 2, 729, 743.
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raised questions about the loyalty of some department off icials.

Members of the White House Staff,

Clifford,

especially Clark

claimed that Truman had not given his consent to

the trusteeship statement or the abandonment of partition.
Clifford accused the State Department of not serving the
President properly.

Truman was fully aware that the depart-

ment favored a temporary trusteeship.
Secretary Lovett,

According to Under

he and Secretary Marshall met with the

President on March 8 and advised him of the failure of the
Security Council to accept the partition recommendation.

At

that time Lovett suggested trusteeship as an alternative:
Mr.

Truman instructed them to pursue the trusteeship alterna-

tive only if they could not obtain approval for partition.
Lovett understandably viewed this as clearance from the President to pursue trusteeship if and when it was necessary.
Also,

the President had reviewed the text of Austin's state-

ment in February and supported the position. (78)

Truman

would later write of the trusteeship proposal:
This was not a rejection of partition but rather an
effort to postpone its effective date until proper
conditions for the establishment of self-government
in the two parts might be established.
My policy with regard to Palestine was not a commitment to any set of dates or circumstances; it
was dedication to the twin deal of international
obligations and the relieving of human misery.
In

(78) See James G. McDonald, ~ ~iss!on in Israel, 19481951 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1951), p. 12; Clifford,
7."F~~tors Influencing Truman," p. 33; and Donovan, Conflict
~££ fEis!~' pp. 372-73.
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this sense, the State Department's trusteeship
proposal was not contrary to my policy. {79)
Reaction to the trusteeship proposal was swift.
he approved Austin's statement or not,

Whether

the President did not

appear to be aware that Austin was going to deliver the
speech on March 19.

Only the day before,

Truman had assured

Chaim Wisemann of the Jewish Agency of American support for
The President was embarrassed after Austin's

partition.
speech,

and the Zionists were angry.

David Niles of the

White House Staff called for Loy Henderson's replacement.
Only the Arab leaders and some moderate Jews welcomed the
announcement. {80)
Henderson realized that a trusteeship policy contained
many of the same pitfalls as partition.

There was danger of

heavy American financial and military involvement in Palestine.

Henderson's office believed that the success of the

trusteeship policy depended on British, Arab,
cooperation.

and Jewish

Henderson urged the British to remain in Pales-

tine after May 15 since.their stake in the area was as great
as that of the United States.

He also invited moderate Arabs

and Jews to the United States to discuss the Palestine situation.(81)

(79)

Truman,

Memoirs,

2:163.

(80) See Clifford, "Factors Influencing Truman," p.
and Wilson, Decision .2E. Palestine, pp. 135-36.

36;

(81) Loy Henderson to George Marshall, March 24, 1948,
and Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett, March 27 and April 9,
1948, K~!!~.L .!2.i~.1 v, pt . 2, 156 - 51, 161 - 6 8, 8 o 4 - o5 .

120

As the date for the end of the British Mandate drew
near,

Henderson became alarmed over the confusion and indeci-

sion in the United Nations concerning the Palestine situation.

He believed that failure of the United States to act

decisively for a solution to the Palestine problem would
result in chaos in Palestine when the British withdrew their
troops.

He felt that the administration should seek a truce

and temporary trusteeship in a confident manner and appeal
for bipartisan support for a peaceful solution. (82)
These recommendations,
too late.
1948,

which he made in late April,

were

At 6:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on May 14,

the provisional government in Palestine proclaimed the

State of Israel.

Eleven minutes later the United States

issued a statement of de facto recognition.

The President

had considered a proper United States response for some time
in the event that the Zionists declared a Jewish State.

He

wrote later that though he realized violence would accompany
the creation of Israel,

Zionist preparations indicated that

they were ready to govern and defend the new state. (83)
White House Staff urged immediate recognition.

(82)

Loy Henderson to Robert Lovett,
FRUSL lii~.1 V, pt. 2, 840-42.

The

Clark Clif-

April 22,

1948,

(83) See Robert H. Ferrell, "The United States Policy in
the Middle East," in American Diplomacz in~ New ~E~' ed.
Stephen D. Kertesz (South Bend: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1961), p. 284; Truman, MemoiE~' 2:164; and for
description of Jewish preparations for the new State, see
Wilson, Q~cision _£.!!Palestine, pp. 139-41.
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ford stated that recognition seemed both in accordance with
Mr.

Truman's overall Palestine policy and an appropriate act

of humanity.
Jewish vote,

Democratic Party leaders,

ever mindful of the

also encouraged recognition.

At a meeting with

the President and members of his staff on May 12,
of State Marshall urged Mr.

Secretary

Truman not to make a decision

based on political motives.

The President,

however,

decided

to recognize the Jewish State immediately upon its proclamation. (84)
The end of the Mandate marked the beginning of full
scale war in Palestine.

The Arab Legion from Transjordan and

small forces from Egypt and Iraq moved in to defend Arab
areas,
troops.

but they were no match for the well-trained Israeli
As the Israelis occupied Arab areas,

their homes.

civilians fled

The plight of half-million Arab refugees became

a new United Nations problem.

The United Nations Relief for

Palestine Refugees helped during the first year,
was no solution to the problem.

but there

Arab nations refused to aid

the refugees as the return of the Palestinians to their homes
was the only alternative acceptable to them.

The Israelis

rejected repatriation of the refugees for obvious security
reasons since there was no provision for an Arab-Israeli

(84) See Clifford, "Factors Influencing Truman," p. 39;
Wilson, De£ision ££ Palestine, p. 142; and for details of
meeting see Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vot~, pp. 108-09.
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peace.

Consequently,

the new Israeli state solved a Jewish

refugee problem by creating an Arab refugee problem. (85)
During the weeks that followed United States recognition
of Israel,

the question arose of American diplomatic repre-

sentation in Israel.

In July President Truman appointed

James G. McDonald to be the government's representative.
would later become

He

the first United States Ambassador to

In keeping with Truman's unilateral policy toward

Israel.

Palestine,

McDonald was the President's man in every way,

as

the White House did not consult the State Department about
the appointment. (86)
On July 14,

1948, a few days after McDonald became

United States Representative to Israel,

Loy Henderson's ser-

vice as Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African
Affairs ended.

The cold warrior,

who only a year before had

been one of the chief architects of Mr. Truman's foreign
policy,

was now an embarrassment to the administration

because of his opposition to its Palestine policy.

He left

NEA for the less-sensitive role of Ambassador to India.

His

departure from NEA saddened colleagues in the State Department and Near Eastern embassies.

All understood the pres-

sures and criticisms to which he had been subjected,

(85) See Schlesinger, Dynamics of
and Arakie, Broken Sword, pp. 76-77.
(86)

McDonald, Mission in Israel,

~orl£

p.

8.

Pow~,

but they

5:343-44;
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praised his fairness,

patience,

to William Porter on August 12,
stay in Washington,
job;

nevertheless,

and integrity. (87)
1948,

In a note

Henderson wrote of his

"It was a thankless and almost killing
in spite of the worries involved I

rather

enjoyed the smoke of battle."(88)

(87) Miscellaneous memoranda and notes,
ment File, Container 8, LWH Papers.

1948,

(88) Loy Henderson to William J. Porter,
India Appointment File, LWH Papers.

India Appoint-

August 12,

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION:
1945-1948 IN RETROSPECT

From 1945-1948 "the smoke of battle" was thick for Loy
Henderson and the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,
but with his appointment to India,
line of fire.
however,

Henderson moved out of the

The Director of NEA left a lasting impression,

especially with regard to the Truman Doctrine and

Palestine policy.

The Truman Doctrine was the product of

many State Department and other administration experts,
including such prominent officials as Dean Acheson and Clark
Clifford, but it clearly also bore the stamp of Loy W. Henderson.

When Henderson became Director of NEA in 1945, he

brought with him a knowledge of the Soviet Union surpassed by
few others.

Understanding Soviet goals and motives,

sistently pointed out

~o

the

adminis~ration

he per-

the importance 6f

the Northern Tier to the United States and called for the use
of economic aid to increase American prestige in the area.
When,

as Henderson predicted, Great Britain could no longer

meet her obligations,

the Director of NEA was a leading

influence in the development of a program he had proposed for
almost two years.
The Truman Doctrine was

just one part of a postwar con-

tainment policy which included the Marshall Plan and the
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North Atlantic Treaty.

This policy attempted to produce an

atmosphere in Europe which was conducive to the growth of
democracy.

The success of this policy is still debated,

but

the subsequent influence of the Truman Doctrine on foreign
affairs should not be

underestima~ed.

The President's speech

called for the preservation.and even expansion of a "way of
life."

The belief in the

~ightness

of the "American way" had

a profound effect on United States foreign policy. (1)
This policy was not entirely new.

The United States had

opposed totalitarianism in both world wars,
ally was now the adversary.

but the former

Some historians have questioned

the doctrine's success and influence on American postwar
Adolf A. Berle,

foreign policy.
Stalin split

Jr. credits the 1948 Tito-

for the collapse of the Greek civil war.

L. Gaddis asserts

that United States policy did not shift

from European to world concerns until the Korean War.
apparent,

though,

John

It is

that the action taken in 1950 would not

have been as likely if 'the Truman Doctrine had not been
couched in such broad terms and accepted by the American
public.

President Truman's speech effectively divided the

world into two opposing camps gated.

one free,

the -Other subju-

The doctrine's implied commitment to the containment

of a perceived communist tyranny set the tone for American
postwar foreign policy.

(1)

See Gaddis,

Sovi~~rica.!!.

It firmly drew the battle lines for

"Turning Point," p.
p. 194.

Co.!!.!E.£.!!.~~tion,

391; and Paterson,

12 6
the Cold War.

George F. Kennan has noted that the sweeping

language of the speech was not Henderson's, (2)

but the doc-

trine clearly reflected Loy Henderson's belief that the
United States had to meet Soviet aggression in the Near East
with a decisive policy of economic and military aid.
The cooperation between the State Department and the
Truman Administration during the formulation of the Truman
Doctrine disappeared in the turmoil of the Palestine affair.
The same pursuit of American principles and national interests which had determined Henderson's Greek-Turkish position
also determined his Palestine position.

Viewing the situa-

tion in the context of world affairs and a policy of containment,

he believed that it was dangerous for the United States

to advocate any position which might lead to the spread of
Soviet influence or to war in the Near East.

Realizing the

Arab hostility to a growing Jewish presence in Palestine,
Henderson felt that governmental support of a Jewish State in
Palestine was not in the best interest of the United States.
He also believed that an attempt to establish such a state
was in opposition to the principle of self-determination.
Despite his misgivings about Truman's Palestine .Policy, Henderson always remained loyal to the President; however,

it

(2) See Gaddis, "Turning Point~" pp. 387, 402; Berle,
of Crisis, pp. 114-15; Freeland, Truman Doctrine and
McCarthyism, p. 88; Lawrence S. Wittner, "The Truman Doctrine
~~th; Defense of Freedom," Di:elomatic History 4:2(Spring
1980): 161; Kuniholm, Cold WaE 1£ Near East, p. 425; and
Kennan, Me~~' p. 315.

~id~~
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was his responsibility as a State Department official to
present the best advice possible,
in accord with Mr.

even if this advice was not

Truman's opinion.

He wrote of President

Truman:
I felt that he almost desperately desired to
receive from the State Department the kind of
advice that he was receiving from his White House
advisers - advice to the effect that it would be in
the interest of the United States, regardless of
the difficulties and dangers involved, for it to
take the lead in establi~hing a Zionist State in
Palestine.
Unfortunately, we could not with a
clear conscience give that advice. (3)
In the end the President adopted policies based upon his own
deep humanitarian concerns and pressures from members of the
White House Staff,

his political party,

and Zionist sup-

porters.
Loy Henderson was accustomed to the heat of battle which
he encountered in Washington from 1945-1948.

His foreign

service career had been fraught with disagreements with the
White House.

Called "prematurely anti-Communist". by Time,

Henderson's dislike and distrust of the Soviet Union and its
leadership led to his departure from the American embassy in
Moscow in 1938 and to his appointment to Iraq from the Division of European Affairs in 1943.

His promotion to India in

1948 was another case of the White House removing the "embarrassment."

Through it all Henderson remained a loyal

(3) Loy Henderson to Frank J. Adler, December 31,
Frank J. Adler File, Container 11, LWH Papers.
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public servant,

performing his duties to the best of his

ability. (4)
Questions concerning Loy Henderson's loyalty arose
almost thirty years later in Clark Clifford's speech before
the American Historical Association.

Clifford accused Hen-

derson and NEA of doing everything in their power to block
Mr.

Truman's humanitarian policy in Palestine,

supporting the

pro-Arab position of the British rather than the President.
Clifford supported his opinion by recounting an argument
which he claimed occurred between Henderson and Truman on
March 24,

1948,

in which the Director of NEA pushed for a

Palestine trusteeship rather than partition. (5)
Clifford's address shocked Henderson both in its charges
of disloyalty and in its inaccuracies.
however,

He was reluctant,

to respond to Clifford's accusations as he had found

that his words were often misquoted or misrepresented.
he answered questions on any topic,

When

Henderson always checked

his recollections against public documents and with those who
had been involved in the proceedings.

Almost eighty-five

years old at the time of the Clifford speech,
his memory as well as his health·were failing,
to Dean Rusk,

he knew that
In a letter

the Assistant Secretary of State for United

Nations Affairs during the Palestine crisis, Henderson

3 6.

(4)

"Cold Warrior," p.

(5)

Clifford,

20.

"Factors Influencing Truman," pp.

26-7,
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denied having attended the meeting with Truman,
shall,

and Rusk on March 24,

1948.

George Mar-

According to Henderson,

he attended no meetings with the President in 1948 and certainly did not argue with him.

He also pointed out other

inaccuracies in the speech such as Clifford's pointing to
certain documents as the product of NEA when they were in
fact prepared by other State Department offices. (6)
It was Clifford's picture of disloyalty that was most
painful to Henderson.

He wrote:

I, can take criticism for bad judgment, for poor
performance, and for inadequacy, but attacks on my
motives and charges of disloyalty and lack of honor
leave scars that are slow to heal.
. (7)
Henderson defended the NEA position,

stating that its members

believed their position was in the best long-term interest of
the United States,

Palestine,

and world peace. (8)

Henderson's battle wounds came not only from the biting
criticism, but also from a sense of having failed in his
attempt to serve these interests.

He believed that the

United States had violated traditional American principles by
its involvement in the creation of the Jewish State, but

(6) See Loy Henderson to Philip c. Jessup, January 23,
1977, Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; Loy
Henderson to Alfred Lilienthal, March 14, 1977, and Loy
Henderson to Dean Rusk, November 20, 1977, Lilienthal File,
LWH Papers,
(7)

Henderson to Lilienthal, March 14,

(8)

Ibid.

1977,

LWH Papers.
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having done so it was obligated to protect Israel and the
multitude of Jews that had chosen to live there.
however,

In 1977,

Henderson looked with sadness at what he termed the

"hideous thirty-year long nightmare" in the Middle East.
The fight in Loy Henderson died slowly,
ever died,

("9)

if indeed it

but the fire and passion evolved into disappoint-

ment and bitterness.
appropriate,

The title "Cold Warrior" had been

as he approached each challenge with a

dedication that few could match.

zeal and

His devotion to American

principles and welfare was unwaivering in any situation.

In

a government motivated by the political and the practical,
however, Mr.

Henderson's ideals were often a stumbling block,

but he never relinquished them.
battle~,

At the height of his NEA

he wrote:

I must admit that at times during by long connection with the Department and the Service I find
myself falling into a state of depression, but it
seems that something always happens which bucks me
up again to continue the fight.
I use the words
"the fight" because I feel that unless we in the
State Department approach the very vital problems
which we are handling in a fighting spirit, we are
licked before we have time to display our
forces. (10)
Loy

w.

Henderson fought a gallant fight,

but his principles

and ideals could not protect him from the pol{tical realities

(9) See Loy ·Henderson to John W. Sutton, July 5, 1974,
and Loy Henderson to Robert B. Steward, January 9, 1974,
Israel-Palestine Correspondence File, LWH Papers; and Henderson to Rusk, November 20, 1977, LWH Papers.
(10) Loy Henderson to William Benton,
Benton File, LWH Papers.

October 6,

1947,

131

of American foreign affairs.

Foreign Service and State

Department officials are expendable when they do not conform
to the administration's they serve.
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